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UNEQUAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW: 
TARGETING AGGRESSORS FOR MASS 
ATROCITY PROSECUTIONS 
Nancy Amoury Combs* 
It is a central tenet of the laws of war that they apply equally to all parties to a 
conflict. For this reason, a party that illegally launches a war benefits from all the 
same rights as a party that must defend against the illegal aggression. Countless 
philosophers have shown that this so-called equal application doctrine is morally 
indefensible and that defenders should have more rights and fewer responsibilities 
than aggressors. The equal application doctrine retains the support of legal 
scholars, however, because they reasonably fear that applying different rules to 
different warring parties will substantially reduce overall compliance with the 
international humanitarian law system as a whole. My Article seeks to bridge these 
divides. It does so by shifting focus from the application of international 
humanitarian law rules to the enforcement of these rules. Although a vast body of 
scholarship has centered on the equal application doctrine, none of it considers the 
way in which that doctrine intersects with post-conflict enforcement of international 
humanitarian law. On the one hand, such neglect is unsurprising because, 
historically, there was no post-conflict enforcement of international humanitarian 
law violations. However, in the last 25 years, a series of international criminal 
tribunals have been established to prosecute large-scale violations of international 
humanitarian law, among other crimes. The creation of these tribunals provides a 
powerful opportunity to reconceptualize and refashion the equal application 
doctrine. Specifically, this Article advocates unequally enforcing international 
humanitarian law as a means of bridging the divide between the moral imperatives 
that excoriate the equal application doctrine and the practical imperatives that 
maintain it. 
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 “Any branch of law whose prescriptions go too far beyond the common 
notions of the society it purports to regulate runs the risk of becoming alien to it and 
therefore neglected by it.”1 
“The dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at the heart of all that is 
most problematic in the moral reality of war.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, in a somewhat obscure case before a somewhat obscure 
international criminal tribunal, a little-known judge dissented to the defendants’ 
convictions on grounds considered heretical in international law circles. The case 
was Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa.3 The tribunal was the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL). And the judge was Sierra Leonean jurist Bankole Thompson. 
Judge Thompson’s heresy was his suggestion that, although the defendants had 
engaged in the criminal acts charged in the indictment, they nonetheless should be 
acquitted because they committed the crimes in order to repress a rebellion and 
                                                                                                                
 1. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 22 (1980). 
 2. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (5th ed. 1977). 
 3. The case is more popularly known as the “CDF” case. 
2019] UNEQUAL ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 157 
restore the democratically elected government to power.4 Or as one commentator 
put it, Judge Thompson maintained that the defendants “should be acquitted of 
committing atrocities because they were on the right side.”5 Judge Thompson’s 
suggestion was greeted with widespread scholarly criticism,6 largely because it 
contravened a bedrock principle of international humanitarian law (IHL): the 
equality of combatants—a doctrine that provides that combatants from both sides to 
an armed conflict must comply with the same rules governing the conduct of the 
armed conflict.7 
The equality-of-combatants doctrine is a necessary corollary of another 
foundational principle of IHL: the strict separation between the jus ad bellum, which 
is the law governing the initiation of the use of force, and the jus in bello, which is 
the law governing the conduct of hostilities.8 Although both bodies of law govern 
aspects of warfare, they are considered to operate in completely distinct spheres.9 
Therefore, even though the jus ad bellum might denominate one party to be in 
violation of the laws governing the initiation of the use of force, that violation has 
no bearing on the application of the laws governing the conduct of warfare. For this 
                                                                                                                
 4. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14J, Separate Concurring and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Thompson, ¶¶ 62–97 ( Aug. 2, 2007). 
 5. William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the 
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 750 (2008). 
 6. Id. (referring to it as a “bizarre dissent”); Milan Marković, 
International Criminal Trials and the Disqualification of Judges on the Basis of Nationality, 
13 WASH. U. GLOBAL L. REV. 1, 35–38 (2014); Valerie Oosterveld & Andrea Marlowe, 
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu. Case No. 
SCSL-04-16-T. at <http://www.sc-sl.org/afrc.html>. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial 
Chamber II, June 20, 2007. Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa. Case No. 
SCSL-04-14-T. at <http://www.sc-sl.org/cdf.html>. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial 
Chamber I, August 2, 2007, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 856 (2007). 
 7. This principle is sometimes referred to as the “symmetry principle.” See David 
Rodin, The Moral Inequality of Soldiers: Why Jus in Bello Asymmetry is Half Right, in JUST 
AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 44 (David Rodin & 
Henry Shue eds., 2008). As will be discussed below, the principle per se applies only in 
international armed conflicts, and the war in Sierra Leone has been held to be a 
noninternational armed conflict. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, ¶ 
977 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/RUF/1234/SCSL-04-15-T-
1234-searchable.pdf. But Judge Thompson’s dissent, and even parts of the Trial Chamber 
majority’s sentencing opinion, have nonetheless been criticized on the basis of this principle 
or its analogue. 
 8. This principle is sometimes referred to as the “independence principle.” Rodin, 
supra note 7, at 44. David Rodin points out that the symmetry principle and the independence 
principle, though related, are not identical. Id. For instance, even if the jus in bello and jus ad 
bellum were not independent, the jus in bello norms could apply symmetrically in a conflict 
if both sides were fighting an unjust war. Id. Conversely, jus in bello rights might be applied 
asymmetrically but not because the jus in bello is dependent on jus ad bellum status. Id. 
              9.       J.H.H. Weiler & Abby Deshman, Far Be It from Thee to Slay the Righteous 
with the Wicked: An Historical and Historiographical Sketch of the Bellicose Debate 
Concerning the Distinction between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 24 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 
25, 26 (2013) (noting “the mainstream among moral thinkers and legal theorists has held fast 
to a complete separation between the jus in bello and jus ad bellum”). 
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reason, states illegally initiating a war benefit from all the rights provided by the jus 
in bello, while states defending against the unlawful use of force must comply with 
all the same rules to which aggressor states are subject.10 Due to the strict separation 
between the two bodies of law, a state may be understood to violate the jus ad bellum 
by launching an illegal war, while complying with all relevant jus in bello rules 
during the conduct of that war. Likewise, a state defending against an illegal war 
might be in compliance with jus ad bellum principles but violate jus in bello 
doctrines in the course of its self-defense. 
This separation between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello has garnered 
many names.11 This Article will adopt Christopher Greenwood’s and Adam 
Roberts’s terminology and call it the “equal application doctrine” or the “equality 
doctrine.”12 But whatever its name, the doctrine is unquestionably counterintuitive. 
After all, why should the soldiers of a state that is launching an illegal, aggressive 
war benefit from all the same rights as the army of the state that is forced to defend 
against the illegal aggression? 
Legal scholars have spilled considerable ink in answering that question.13 
Some scholars point to case law or treaties that adopt the equal application doctrine 
as governing law.14 Others appeal to policy arguments predicated on human rights 
or criminal law principles. And still others invoke the structure and features of IHL 
itself in defense of the doctrine.15 But although legal scholars start from divergent 
points, they inevitably reach the same conclusion; namely, that the equal application 
doctrine reduces the harm caused by warfare. Specifically, commentators maintain 
that if the equal application doctrine did not exist, then soldiers would be 
dramatically less likely to comply with the jus in bello rules.16 The equal application 
doctrine, then, is crucial for the maintenance of the IHL system as we know it. 
Although legal scholars take many paths to this conclusion, perhaps the 
most common one begins from the premise that compliance with the laws of war 
requires reciprocity. That is, Army A will be willing to comply with rules requiring 
them to treat Army B’s civilians and captured soldiers humanely only because the 
same rules require Army B to treat Army A’s civilians and captured soldiers 
humanely. If, however, the application of those rules were predicated on the legality 
                                                                                                                
           10.         Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle Under 
Pressure, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 932 (2008). 
 11. Some scholars describe it as “the principle of autonomy of jus in bello with 
regard to jus ad bellum,” François Bugnion, Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 167, 168 (2003), whereas others call it 
the “dualistic axiom.” Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of 
Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 56–
61 (2009). 
 12. Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius Ad Bellum and Ius in 
Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 225 (1983); Roberts, supra note 10, at 931. 
 13. See Weiler & Deshman, supra note 9 (canvassing scholarship on the equal 
application doctrine). 
 14. See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 59–80 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
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of a state’s use of force, then the reciprocity that currently drives compliance with 
IHL rules would no longer exist. The soldiers of the defending state would not be 
obliged to comply with jus in bello rules, and the soldiers of the aggressor state, 
though still legally obliged to comply, would be unlikely to do so because their own 
soldiers and civilians would gain no benefit from their compliance. As Yoram 
Dinstein put it: “No State (least of all a State which, through its aggression, has 
already perpetrated the supreme crime against international law) will abide by the 
strictures of the jus in bello if it knew that it was not going to derive reciprocal 
benefits from the application of the norms.”17 The inevitable results would be the 
widespread flouting of jus in bello restrictions and the concomitant dramatic 
increase in the brutality of warfare. 
Although legal scholars uniformly defend the equal application doctrine, 
scholars from other disciplines have been less supportive. Certainly, political 
philosopher Michael Walzer defended the doctrine in his iconic 1977 book, Just and 
Unjust Wars. However, in recent times, most philosophy scholars have deemed the 
doctrine morally indefensible.18 Moreover, at the same time that scholars of various 
disciplines support or critique the equal application doctrine in books and articles, 
diplomats and states engage with it in positive law and on the battlefield, and we 
find similar tensions in these realms. When it comes to international law doctrine, 
the equality principle is firmly established. It appears in universally ratified treaties, 
such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions,19 in almost universally ratified treaties, such 
as Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,20 and in oft-cited post-World War II 
case law.21 As for states, they generally accept the principle as a matter of law and 
proclaim their adherence thereto, but their practice sometimes suggests a less-than-
firm commitment. In particular, an examination of recent conflicts indicates that 
states’ interpretations of certain foundational jus in bello rules are sometimes 
contingent on the justness of the states’ cause during the conflict.22 Said differently, 
the more that states are convinced that their cause is just, the more they are willing 
to violate jus in bello rules in their effort to prevail. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the equal application doctrine creates 
a series of divides: at a minimum, it divides legal reasoning from moral reasoning, 
and it divides legal doctrine from state practice. This Article will flesh out and 
analyze these divides in more detail below, but we can summarize this Article’s 
conclusions by saying that they stem largely from the divide between principle and 
                                                                                                                
 17. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 157 (2005). 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 87–101. 
 19. The rule is understood to appear, for instance, in Common Article 1 of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, which provides that the High Contracting parties “undertake to 
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 1,  
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (emphasis added). 
 20. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Preamble,  
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 21. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 102–15 and accompanying text. 
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practice. At a basic moral level, we know that the aggressive and genocidal goals of 
Nazi soldiers should have been profoundly relevant to the way in which the law of 
war regulated their conduct. But we likewise recognize that it is counterproductive 
to insist on abstract moral principles when the application of those principles—in 
the real and flawed world in which we live—will lead to more suffering. Christopher 
Kutz puts it well when he acknowledges the equality principle to be “compelling” 
but notes that it “leave[s] a bad taste in the philosophical mouth . . . [because] it 
elevates function over reason, means over ends, and creates an entrenched normative 
structure that is fundamentally incoherent with the structures that govern our lives 
in the realm of private violence.”23 Put differently, the equality principle is founded 
not on what is right but on what is possible; as a consequence, it highlights in stark 
relief the yawning divide between the world as it should be and the world as it is. 
My Article seeks to bridge these divides. It does so by shifting focus from 
the application of IHL rules to the post-conflict enforcement of those rules. Although 
a vast quantity of scholarship has centered on the equal application doctrine, none 
of that scholarship considers the way in which that doctrine intersects with post-
conflict enforcement of IHL. On the one hand, such neglect should come as no 
surprise given that, historically, there was no post-conflict enforcement of IHL 
rules.24 Lack of adequate enforcement continues to plague both international law in 
general and IHL in particular. However, in the last 25 years, a series of international 
criminal tribunals have been created to prosecute large-scale violations of IHL, 
among other crimes. The existence of these tribunals creates a powerful opportunity 
to reconceptualize and refashion the equal application doctrine. In particular, this 
Article argues that allocating international criminal prosecutions at least partially on 
the basis of aggressor status would help to bridge the divide between the moral 
imperatives that excoriate the equal application doctrine and the practical 
imperatives that maintain it. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I describes the equal application 
doctrine and the scholarship and practice it has generated. It shows that the principle 
has been subject to widespread theoretical criticism but persists because we expect 
that its abandonment would damage, if not destroy, the IHL regulatory system. Part 
II acknowledges the practical necessity of applying jus in bello rules equally across 
all groups, but it suggests that that equal application need not extend into the realm 
of enforcement. That is, Part II contends that the enforcement of IHL violations 
should be allocated unequally across different groups of combatants. Such an 
unequal allocation of enforcement, I argue, will ameliorate  the counterintuitive and 
                                                                                                                
 23. Christopher Kutz, Fearful Symmetry, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE 
MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 69, 70 (David Rodin & Henry Shue eds., 2008). 
 24. See, e.g., John Dugard, Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: The Punishment of Offenders, 324 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 453 (1998) 
(noting that “national courts have a poor record when it comes to the prosecution of war crimes 
and other international crimes”); Rod Rastan, Comment on Victor’s Justice and the Viability 
of Ex Ante Standards, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 569, 589 (2010) (“Victims may number in the 
tens or hundreds of thousands or, in the case of displacement, millions . . . . In the face of 
large-scale violence, by contrast, it remains an uncomfortable reality that not every act of 
killing, rape, or torture will be investigated or face judicial sanction, even where evidence is 
readily available and perpetrators identifiable.”). 
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morally distasteful aspects of the equal application doctrine without giving rise to 
the deleterious consequences that prevent us from abandoning the doctrine 
altogether. 
My proposal would impact the international criminal tribunals currently 
charged with enforcing IHL violations, so Part III considers how it would alter and 
improve their existing practice. In Part III, we learn that although neither past nor 
present international tribunals have expressly considered aggressor status when 
determining whom to prosecute, their statutes and precedents easily allow them to 
do so. In addition, Part III invokes philosophical literature, psychology research, 
domestic criminal law practice, and the experiences of the international criminal 
tribunals themselves to argue that allocating prosecutions, at least in part on the basis 
of aggressor status, better aligns the tribunals’ practices with fundamental moral 
intuitions and, as a consequence, enhances the tribunals’ ability to advance many of 
their core penological goals. 
I. THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE: DOCTRINE, RATIONALE, AND 
SCHOLARLY DIVISIONS 
As a historical matter, the equal application doctrine is of relatively recent 
vintage because it is only in the last century that international law has governed both 
the initiation of warfare and its conduct. That is, for most of history, commentators 
had no reason to consider the relationship (or need for separation) between the jus 
ad bellum and the jus in bello because, for most of history, only one or the other of 
those bodies of law existed. 
The jus ad bellum has a much lengthier history in that it derives from just 
war notions that originated in the Roman Empire and evolved over many subsequent 
centuries.25 During these many centuries, scholars and commentators refined and 
elaborated the principles governing the initiation of warfare, but they paid scant 
attention to the conduct of hostilities once the war had begun.26 The Romans, for 
instance, imposed no restraints on the means and methods of warfare.27 Scholars in 
later centuries did occasionally condemn the infliction of unnecessary suffering on 
civilians during warfare,28 and norms of chivalry generated certain narrow 
restrictions on certain kinds of weapons in conflicts between certain sets of 
combatants.29 However, these notions were underdeveloped, and to the extent they 
                                                                                                                
 25. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 65. 
 26. See Sloane, supra note 11, at 50; Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence and 
the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF 
PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 273, 274 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala 
Tabory eds., 1989) (noting that the traditional just war theory imposed no limits on the amount 
of force that could be used in a conflict) [hereinafter Greenwood, Self-Defence]. 
 27. Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 391, 395 (1993) (“[O]nce the cause was just, any means to achieve the end was 
permissible.”); Sloane, supra note 11, at 57. 
 28. John Finnis, The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law 
Tradition, in CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ETHICS 202–03 (John Coleman ed., 2007) (describing St. 
Thomas Aquinas’s condemnation of willful killing of civilians). 
 29. Sloane, supra note 11, at 58–59. 
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existed at all, they were viewed as inextricably linked to the just war principles that 
governed the conflict’s initiation.30 For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas believed that 
“the justness of the resort to war determined to a large extent the limits on the 
conduct of war.”31 
It was not until the nineteenth century that states began to develop a body 
of rules to apply to the conduct of warfare.32 Seeking to reduce the barbarity that so 
often accompanies warfare, states concluded a series of treaties that restricted their 
actions in a variety of war-related activities—from their selection of weapons,33 to 
their targeting decisions,34 to their treatment of the victims of warfare.35 However, 
by the time that those treaties were concluded, jus ad bellum norms were no longer 
considered a part of international law. Indeed, by the nineteenth century, just war 
theories no longer held sway, as positivism had replaced both natural law and 
theology as the foundation for the laws of nations.36 By then, secular international 
law had developed to govern numerous aspects of international relations, but it was 
not understood to regulate the use of force.37 Rather, war-making was considered an 
attribute of sovereignty38 that could be employed as a legal instrument of national 
policy.39 Thus, the initiation of warfare was understood to be a legal activity.40 As a 
                                                                                                                
 30. See Gregory M. Reichberg, Just War and Regular War: Competing 
Paradigms, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 
193, 193 (David Rodin & Henry Shue eds., 2008). 
 31. ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 22 (2008); Gardam, supra note 27, at 395. 
 32. A few of these rules had ancient antecedents. See 2 Kings 6:21–23; THE LAW 
CODE OF MANU 112–13 (Patrick Olivelle ed. & trans., 2004); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE 
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 20–23 (2d ed. 2001). 
 33. See, e.g., Declaration Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and Explosives 
from Balloons (Hague, IV), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839. 
 34. See, e.g., Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its Annex, Regulation, Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277. 
 35. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940; Convention Relating to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021. 
 36. Sloane, supra note 11, at 61–62. 
 37. See, e.g., ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 3 
(1955) (“According to the generally accepted theory, the act of resorting to war was 
interpreted, save in exceptional circumstances, as being neither legal nor illegal, but simply a 
fact, situation or event which occurred periodically in the relations among states.”). 
 38. François Bugnion, Guerre juste, guerre d’agression et droit international 
humanitaire, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 523, 527 (Sept. 2002), translated in INT’L COMMITTEE 
RED CROSS 7 (Sept. 30, 2002), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc-847-2002-
bugnion-ang.pdf. 
 39. Gardam, supra note 27, at 396; Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 877, 878 (2004) [hereinafter Dinstein, Comments on War]. 
 40. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 206, 210 (1953) (“For under the law then in force every war was, legally, just; 
every war was legal.”); see also Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, Collective 
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consequence, just as in the preceding centuries, there was no basis for evaluating the 
relationship between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum because, again, only one 
body of law—at this point, the jus in bello—existed. 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, international law had come to 
regulate both the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum.41 Jus ad bellum regulation began 
to re-emerge during the early decades of the twentieth century42 and culminated in 
the United Nations (UN) Charter, which prohibits the use of force except when it is 
used in self-defense or as a means of collective security authorized by the UN 
Security Council.43 It was at this point that serious questions arose regarding the 
relationship between these two legal regimes: the rules governing the initiation of 
warfare and the rules governing the conduct of warfare. Certainly, when the 
initiation of an armed conflict was not governed by international law then it was 
understood that the laws governing the conduct of warfare applied equally to both 
sides of the conflict.44 Indeed, in those days, there would have been no basis for the 
jus in bello rules not to apply equally because both sides to the conflict stood on an 
equal legal footing. Once international law came to restrict the use of force, 
however, then an argument could be made that the laws governing the conduct of 
warfare should operate differentially depending on whether the state in question had 
launched an illegal war or was, by contrast, defending against illegal warfare.45 
                                                                                                                
Security, Law of War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 739, 741–
42 (Max Sørensen ed., 1968). 
 41. See Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, 37 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 553, 558 (1997). 
 42. Before the conclusion of the UN Charter, the Kellogg-Briand Pact restricted 
the use of force. Its signatories condemned “recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies” and renounced it “as an instrument of national policy.” Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343; League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 94, at 58–64. 
 43. U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 4, 24, ¶ 1, 39, 51. 
 44. See, e.g., Weiler & Deshman, supra note 9, at 28. 
 45. Denise Bindschedler-Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed 
Conflicts, in CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 
3, 9 (1971) (“The prohibition on the use of force in the Charter of the United Nations has 
sometimes led to the conclusion that . . . the aggressor would have no [jus in bello] rights, 
while whoever act[ed] in self-defense would have unlimited rights.”). 
164 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61:155 
And that argument was made.46 Some scholars, invoking the legal maxim 
ex injuria jus non oritar,47 maintained that states that initiated illegal wars should 
not gain the benefits of the jus in bello protections.48 Others suggested that because 
most of the jus in bello rules predated the use-of-force restrictions, then those 
restrictions rendered the jus in bello rules superfluous.49 That is, if the initiation of 
armed conflict is illegal in virtually all circumstances, then we have little reason to 
consider the laws governing warfare. Indeed, some commentators worried that any 
attention paid to jus in bello rules would necessarily—and inappropriately—detract 
attention from the new jus ad bellum restrictions that were designed to prevent 
wars.50 As one scholar put that view: “It is immoral to admit the existence of the law 
of armed conflicts because this confers a certain legitimacy upon war and detracts 
from the only real task, its abolition.”51 Under the sway of this theory, the 
International Law Commission went so far as to refuse to engage in a codification 
of the laws of war because “public opinion might interpret its action as showing lack 
of confidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United Nations 
for maintaining peace.”52 
Although these arguments have surface appeal, in the end, legal scholars 
roundly rejected calls for a discriminatory application of the jus in bello. Some 
                                                                                                                
 46. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 406 
(1963) (“As the illegality and, indeed, criminality of aggressive war became established, some 
writers began to suggest that the laws of war did not apply in favour of an aggressor, or that 
at least there should be some discrimination in the application of the laws of war.”); 
Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 206 (“Others have advanced the opinion that, [in the case of an 
aggressive war], the accepted rules of war operate only at the option of the States resisting 
aggression; that such States may modify them at will; and that the aggressor State . . . cannot 
derive from their initial illegality in any legal rights, including the rights usually associated 
with the conduct of war.”); Weiler & Deshman, supra note 9, at 32 (“The International 
Community did not have to wait long until the UN Charter provided the sound legal footing 
necessary to argue seriously that jus in bello rights and obligations had been fundamentally 
altered.”). 
 47. Translated as “the law does not arise from injustice.” UNITED NATIONS, Ex 
injuria jus non oritur, UN.org: UNTERM, 
https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/Display/record/UNHQ/ex_injuria_jus_non_oritur/C40ED8
CCD326321A85256A0000075D40 (last visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
 48. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 156; Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 212; 
Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of 
the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963, 966 (2008); Marco Sassóli, Ius ad 
Bellum and Ius in Bello—The Separation Between the Legality of the Use of Force and 
Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Warfare: Crucial or Outdated?, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 241, 245 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena 
Pegic eds., 2007). 
 49. Moussa, supra note 48, at 965. 
 50. Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 206; Greenwood, supra note 12, at 221; Sassóli, 
supra note 48, at 245. 
 51. Bindschedler-Robert, supra note 45, at 10. 
 52. Sassóli, supra note 48, at 245. 
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commentators sought to refute these arguments on their own terms,53 but most 
invoked independent rationales to defend the equal application doctrine. Indeed, 
only a few years after the adoption of the UN Charter, Hersch Lauterpacht published 
an influential article advancing many of the most compelling justifications for the 
doctrine.54 These arguments have been repeated, expanded, and elaborated upon in 
the succeeding decades. Some arguments appeal to preexisting legal doctrine; others 
appeal to the purposes animating the law; and still others invoke broad, systemic 
policy justifications in support of the equal application doctrine. 
The doctrinal arguments tend to center on jus in bello treaty provisions and 
post-World War II case law. For instance, a variety of post-World War II precedents 
rejected efforts to apply jus in bello rules differentially on the basis of jus ad bellum 
status.55 One such precedent is the Hostages Trial, conducted before the U.S. 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. There, the prosecution had argued that, because 
Germany had waged an illegal war against Greece and Yugoslavia, it was not 
entitled to invoke the rules of warfare relating to belligerent occupation.56 Similarly, 
the prosecution contended that the inhabitants of the occupied territories were 
entitled to resist the occupation forces despite the fact that the laws of war would 
otherwise prohibit such resistance.57 The Tribunal rejected the prosecutor’s 
contention. Although it assumed the illegality of Germany’s war for the sake of 
argument, the Tribunal nonetheless concluded: 
[I]t does not follow that every act by the German occupation 
forces . . . is a crime or that any and every act undertaken by the 
population of the occupied country against the German occupation 
forces thereby became legitimate defense . . . . [I]nternational law 
makes no distinction between a lawful and unlawful occupant in 
dealing with the respective duties of occupant and population in 
                                                                                                                
 53. For instance, Robert Tucker acknowledged that, if a state wages an unlawful 
war, the principle ex injuria jus non oritur may prevent the state from legitimizing the 
territorial gains or other concrete benefits it obtained through its illegal use of force. He 
further stated:  
But these considerations are quite independent of the assertion, which is 
here considered as unwarranted, that the same principle ex injuria jus non 
oritur must be interpreted further to mean that no legal consequence may 
result from the illegal act or that no legal rights of the wrongdoer may 
come into operation as a result of the act, legal rights specifically provided 
by law for just this very contingency. (Emphasis in original). 
TUCKER, supra note 37, at 8–9. 
 54. Lauterpacht, supra note 40. 
 55. But see Michael Mandel, Aggressors’ Rights: The Doctrine of ‘Equality 
Between Belligerents’ and the Legacy of Nuremberg, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 627, 629 (2011) 
(arguing, against “the conventional wisdom,” that the legal equality of belligerents principle 
“is not supported by the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg era or developments since”). 
           56.     U.S. v. List (The Hostage Case), 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuernberg Military Tribunals 759, 852 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1950), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf.  
 57. See id.  
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occupied territory. . . . Whether the invasion was lawful or criminal 
is not an important factor in the consideration of this subject.58 
The Tribunal went on to quote Oppenheim, who stated:  
Whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and whether 
or not the cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules of 
international law are valid as to what must not be done, may be done, 
and must be done by the belligerents . . . . This is so, even if the 
declaration of war is ipso facto a violation of international law.59  
Other World War II tribunals were equally resistant to arguments that made the 
application of the jus in bello rules in any way contingent upon the warring parties’ 
jus ad bellum stance.60 
It is not only case law but also a variety of jus in bello treaty provisions that 
support the equal application doctrine. Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, for instance, obligates states parties to adhere to the Conventions’ 
provisions “in all circumstances.”61 The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions 
explains that the words “in all circumstances” mean that “the application of the 
Convention does not depend on the character of the conflict. Whether a war is ‘just’ 
or ‘unjust,’ whether it is a war of aggression or of resistance to aggression, the 
protection and care due to the wounded and sick are in no way affected.”62 
Approximately 30 years later, the drafters of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions reaffirmed the equal application doctrine even more clearly in the 
Protocol’s Preamble. It provides that the provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, along with those of Protocol I, apply “in all circumstances to all 
persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction 
                                                                                                                
 58. Id. at 1247.   
 59. Id. 
 60. Other American tribunals also affirmed the separation. See United States v. 
Josef Altstoetter (The Justice Case), in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1026–27 (Drexel E. Sprecher & John H.E. Fried eds., 1951) (refusing 
to adopt the view that because the war “was a criminal war of aggression every act which 
would have been legal in a defensive war was illegal in this one”). Dutch courts followed suit; 
in the Christiansen case, for instance, a Dutch Special Court held that “[t]he rules of 
international law, in so far as they regulate the methods of warfare and the occupation of 
enemy territory, make no distinction between wars which have been started legally and those 
which have been started illegally.” Re Christiansen (Holland, Special Court, Arnhem, 1948) 
A.D. 412, 413; see also In re Zuhlke (Holland, Special Court of Cassation, 1948) A.D. 416, 
416; Moussa, supra note 48, at 984–85 (discussing two ways in which the tribunal in the High 
Command case reaffirmed the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello); Sassóli, 
supra note 48, at 249 (noting that when the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission was 
presented with the issue, it “correctly held that any ius ad bellum issues could not affect the 
applicability of IHL to the conflict”). 
 61. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 62. The Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949: Commentary, Vol. I, The Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field 27 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952). 
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based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.”63 
Underlying the doctrinal commitment to the equal application doctrine are 
teleological arguments based on the purposes the laws are intended to serve. For 
instance, Lauterpacht and subsequent commentators pointed out that unequal 
application of the jus in bello rules would frustrate the humanitarian goals that the 
jus in bello rules seek to advance.64 As Christopher Greenwood explains, “[t]he 
purpose of the humanitarian rules which comprise the bulk of the ius in bello is not 
to confer benefits upon the parties to a conflict but to protect individuals and to give 
expression to concepts of international public policy.”65 Similarly, Marco Sassòli 
notes: 
War victims need as much protection against the belligerent fighting 
in conformity with the ius ad bellum as against a belligerent who 
violated ius contra bellum. They are not responsible for ‘their’ State’s 
violation of international law . . . and they require the same protection 
regardless of whether they are on the ‘right’ or on the ‘wrong’ side.66  
Other commentators observe that the jus in bello rules not only seek humanitarian 
ends but also bestow rights on individuals.67 Judith Gardam, for instance, considers 
the aggressor state’s illegality to be irrelevant to the application of the jus in bello 
because jus in bello rules “are conferred by international law on individuals, not on 
states, so that soldiers and civilians are entitled to the benefit of the rules even if the 
state is engaged in illegal hostilities.”68 Yoram Dinstein agrees, noting that a “right 
afforded by international law on an individual . . . is not rescinded just because his 
State has acted in contravention of international law.”69 
                                                                                                                
 63. Protocol I, supra note 20, at Preamble. 
 64. As Lauterpacht put it: 
The effects of any differentiation between the aggressor and those 
opposing him appear even more clearly if it is borne in mind that most 
rules of warfare are, in a sense, of a humanitarian character inasmuch as 
their object is to safeguard . . . human life and some other fundamental 
human rights . . . . 
Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 214; see also Gardam, supra note 27, at 411 (“The basis for 
the equal application of the jus in bello in present times is the humanitarian nature of the 
rules.”); ROBERT KOLB, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
30 (2014). 
 65. Greenwood, supra note 12, at 227. 
 66. Sassóli, supra note 48, at 245–46; see also Antoine Bouvier, The Relationship 
Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: An “Orthodox” View, 100 ASIL PROCEEDINGS 109, 
111–12 (2006). 
 67. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 10 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter Greenwood, Historical Development]. 
 68. Gardam, supra note 27, at 411. 
 69. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 157; Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the 
Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 373 (1953) (“[I]nsofar as the international law of war 
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Finally, and most importantly, legal scholars point to a host of compelling 
policy considerations that support the equal application doctrine and explain its 
appearance in treaties and case law. The most prominent line of argumentation is 
based on the need for reciprocity in the rules of warfare.70 In particular, 
commentators believe that jus in bello norms have succeeded in curbing excesses in 
past conflicts—notwithstanding the usual animosity between the warring states—
only because the jus in bello norms generated mutual advantages for both sides.71 A 
state may not wish to provide humane conditions for captured enemy soldiers in 
prisoner-of-war camps, for instance, but it must if it wants its opponents to treat its 
own captured soldiers humanely. For this reason, Dinstein considers the equal 
application doctrine “first and foremost, a precept of common sense.”72 As he puts 
it: “No state (least of all a State which, through its aggression, has already 
perpetrated the supreme crime against international law) would abide by the 
strictures of the jus in bello if it knew that it was not going to derive reciprocal 
benefits from the application of the norms.”73 Or, as Lauterpacht famously stated, 
“it is impossible to visualize the conduct of hostilities in which one side would be 
bound by rules of warfare without benefiting from them and the other side would 
benefit from rules of warfare without being bound by them.”74 
A second compelling defense of the equal application doctrine is premised 
on the practical difficulty of determining who—in a given conflict—is the aggressor. 
Belligerents inevitably view their cause as both just and legal.75 Thus, as Dinstein 
observes, “no aggressor is ever willing to concede that it has indeed acted in breach 
of the jus ad bellum.”76 Even obtaining an agreement regarding the legality of a use 
of force among third parties or international bodies is difficult in the midst of 
                                                                                                                
confers rights upon soldiers and civilians as individuals, they continue to enjoy these rights 
even though acting in behalf of a state engaged in illegal hostilities.”). 
 70. KOLB, supra note 64, at 30 (“IHL could not work if it was not based on some 
degree of reciprocity (no State would accept that the adverse party takes liberties with the law 
of armed conflicts without reciprocating, thus inaugurating a spiralling down).”). 
 71. Id.  
 72. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 157; see also David Rodin & Henry Shue, 
Introduction to JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 1, 
2 (David Rodin & Henry Shue eds., 2008) (describing “the strong separation between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello” as forming “the ‘common sense’ ethics of war”). 
 73. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 157. As Bugnion said:  
It is impossible to demand that an adversary respect the laws and customs 
of war while at the same time declaring that every one of its acts will be 
treated as a war crime because of the mere fact that the act was carried out 
in the context of a war of aggression. 
 Bugnion, supra note 38, at 55; see also Moussa, supra note 48, at 967. 
 74. Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 212. 
 75. Sassóli, supra note 48, at 246 (“Most belligerents and those who fight for them 
are convinced their cause is just.”); KOLB, supra note 64, at 30; Greenwood, Self-Defence, 
supra note 26, at 287 (reporting that both parties to a conflict typically claim to be acting in 
self-defense); Jeff McMahan, The Morality of War and the Law of War, in JUST AND UNJUST 
WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 19, 28 (David Rodin & Henry Shue 
eds., 2008) [hereinafter McMahan, The Morality of War]. 
 76. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 157. 
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conflict,77 in part because political allegiances distort objective assessments, and in 
part because the prevailing legal standards are sufficiently vague that they permit a 
range of reasonable conclusions.78 The UN Security Council has the theoretical 
authority to determine the legality of a given use of force, but it rarely does so.79 
Thus, because the international community lacks an authoritative and functional 
decision-maker, then even if we considered it justifiable to apply jus in bello rules 
differentially, in accordance with the legality of a party’s use of force, it would be 
almost impossible to do so because it would be almost impossible to determine 
which party was in violation of the jus ad bellum rules.80 
These two policy arguments lead commentators to the same conclusion; 
namely, any incursion on the equal application doctrine in a given conflict will 
inevitably lead the parties to that conflict to ignore relevant jus in bello norms. 
Indeed, Bugnion maintains that those who argue for an unequal application of jus in 
bello norms on the basis of jus ad bellum status “betray[] a profound lack of 
understanding of the law of war in general and of international humanitarian law in 
particular.”81 According to Bugnion, the laws of war consist “of a set of balances 
between rights and obligations; if these balances are upset, what remains is not the 
unilateral application of the law but lawlessness and anarchy.”82 Other scholars 
wholeheartedly agree. Given the importance of reciprocity, Lauterpacht concludes 
that any effort to deny the benefits of the jus in bello rules to aggressor states “would 
transform the contest into a struggle which may be subject to no regulation at all.”83 
That is, “[t]he result would be the abandonment of most rules of warfare.”84 The 
                                                                                                                
 77. Roberts, supra note 10, at 956. 
 78. Id.; see Bugnion, supra note 38, at 50. 
 79. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 157; Bugnion, supra note 38, at 15 (noting that a 
determination that aggression has occurred requires the affirmative vote of all five permanent 
members and therefore is unlikely to occur); Greenwood, Self-Defence, supra note 23, at 287. 
Moreover, as Lauterpacht points out, when the five permanent members of the Security 
Council are able to agree that a state has launched an illegal war, then “the impact of such a 
finding will foreshadow a probability of collective action of such overwhelming magnitude 
and efficacy as to bring about a rapid, if not instantaneous, liquidation of the conflict” such 
that questions regarding the application of the jus in bello will not arise. Lauterpacht, supra 
note 40, at 208. 
 80. Lauterpacht puts it thus:   
The reasons which make it imperative to permit the full application, during 
the war and as between the belligerents, of the rules of war are especially 
cogent when it is borne in mind that in the present state of international 
organization there may be no means, so long as the war lasts, by which an 
authoritative judgment can be arrived at on the question as to which 
belligerent side is the aggressor. 
Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 220. 
 81. Bugnion points out that “the purpose of the laws and customs of war is not to 
confer subjective rights on belligerents with no corresponding obligations or vice versa. On 
the contrary, it is to protect the individual by establishing objective rules which impose both 
rights and obligations on all belligerents.” Bugnion, supra note 38, at 16. 
 82. Id. at 17. 
 83. Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 212. 
 84. Id. 
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absence of authoritative decision-making on the international plane leads other 
commentators to the very same conclusion.85 As noted, the lack of an authoritative 
decision-maker enables belligerents to charge their opponents with aggression.86 If, 
on the basis of that charge, each belligerent felt free to deny its enemies the benefit 
of the jus in bello, then it is “unlikely that any country would ever pay heed to 
international humanitarian law.”87 Indeed, Dinstein pessimistically predicts that, if 
the equal application doctrine were abandoned, “[m]ankind might simply slide back 
to the barbaric cruelty of war in the style of Genghis Khan.”88 
These policy arguments have unquestionably carried the day among legal 
scholars. Commentator after commentator has described the equal application 
doctrine as nothing less than dogma.89 Some have called it “a cardinal principle,”90 
others deem it a “fundamental tenet,”91 still others label it “axiomatic,”92 and Yoram 
Dinstein describes it as “one of the most basic principles of modern international 
law.”93 For this reason, Adam Roberts summed up the view of many when he 
asserted that it is “a cardinal principle of jus in bello that it applies in cases of armed 
conflict whether or not the inception of the conflict is lawful under jus ad bellum, 
and applies equally to all belligerents.”94 
But it is not only legal scholars and practitioners who have opined about 
the equal application doctrine. Philosophers have also weighed in, and their views 
have been both more nuanced and more critical. To be sure, political philosopher 
                                                                                                                
 85. For example, Greenwood states: 
Moreover, since in most armed conflict there is no authoritative 
determination by the Security Council of which party is the aggressor, 
both parties usually claim to be acting in self-defense, . . . [and] any 
attempt to make the rules of humanitarian law distinguish between the 
standards of treatment to be accorded to prisoners of war or civilians 
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of humanitarian law. 
Greenwood, Historical Development, supra note 67, at 10–11. 
 86. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 87. DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 157. 
 88. Id.; see also Gardam, supra note 27, at 394 (arguing that any retreat from the 
equality principle will lead to reduced jus in bello standards). 
 89. Sloane, supra note 11, at 49; Louise Doswald-Beck, International 
Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 37 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 35, 53 (1997); 
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Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 12 (2004); Roberts, supra note 10, at 
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UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 230 (David Rodin & Henry 
Shue eds., 2008). 
 91. Greenwood, supra note 12, at 225. 
 92. Sloane, supra note 11, at 50. 
 93. Dinstein, Comments on War, supra note 39, at 881. 
 94. Roberts, supra note 10, at 936. 
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Michael Walzer offers an eloquent and compelling defense of the doctrine in his 
influential book, Just and Unjust Wars,95 but even he acknowledges the moral 
tensions to which it gives rise.96 Moreover, in more recent times, so-called 
revisionist philosophers have subjected the doctrine to a particularly skeptical 
gaze.97 Jeff McMahan is perhaps the leading voice in this body of critical 
scholarship. His critiques span many articles and book chapters and address a variety 
of doctrinal issues,98 so my brief summary will not do his work justice. However, 
for our purposes, it is enough to articulate a few of McMahan’s contentions as well 
as his ultimate conclusion. 
Standard IHL rules permit a combatant to attack other combatants, and due 
to the equal application doctrine, that right is bestowed on combatants from both 
parties to a conflict. That is, pursuant to the equal application doctrine, combatants 
from aggressor states are just as entitled to attack combatants from defender states 
as vice versa. However, McMahan shows that—morally speaking—combatants 
from aggressor states are not entitled to attack combatants from defender states 
because the latter are innocent “in the relevant sense,”99 and they specifically retain 
a right not to be attacked.100 Reasoning from this proposition, McMahan asserts that 
attacks by combatants from aggressor states always violate various cardinal jus in 
bello rules, including those requiring that attacks be proportional and necessary.101 
For instance, McMahan maintains that “a war can satisfy the requirement of 
necessity only if it is necessary for the achievement of a just cause.”102 Similarly, 
although the proportionality requirement is conventionally understood to be 
satisfied when the harm caused by a military action is proportional to the military 
advantage achieved, McMahan asserts that “one cannot weigh the bad effects that 
one would cause against the contributions one’s act would make to the end of victory 
without having some sense of what the good effects of victory would be.”103 In 
particular, “[i]f one’s cause is unjust, the value of the event—victory—would 
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 97. See Weiler & Deshman, supra note 9, at 52. 
 98. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 708–
18 (2004) [hereinafter McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War]; Jeff McMahan, On the Moral 
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 101. Id. at 702–22. 
 102. Id. at 708. 
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presumably be negative, not positive.”104 In sum, McMahan concludes that, “as a 
matter of basic morality, the principles of jus in bello cannot be independent of those 
of jus ad bellum [because] it is simply not morally permissible to fight in a war with 
an unjust cause.”105 Other philosophers have quibbled with,106 refined, and 
elaborated107 on McMahan’s critiques, but most agree with his conclusion that—as 
a matter of basic morality—the equal application doctrine cannot be defended.108 As 
Christopher Kutz puts it, “[i]f death and destruction matter, as they do, and if reasons 
matter morally, as they do, then differences in combatants’ reasons for bringing 
about death and destruction must also matter morally.”109 
Although revisionist philosophy scholars generally agree that the equal 
application doctrine is morally indefensible, they are also troubled by the likely 
practical consequences of its elimination, so many have constructed theories that 
ameliorate the consequences of their moral conclusions. For instance, even though 
Henry Shue acknowledges that the equal application doctrine violates ordinary 
moral principles, he minimizes the impact of that conclusion by maintaining that 
“[t]he circumstances of war are so different from the context of ordinary life” that 
“different specific standards from the specific standards that apply to ordinarily 
life . . . apply inside war.”110 Similarly, Christopher Kutz seeks to reduce the tension 
between the equal application principle and ordinary morality by offering “a modest 
form of skepticism about the role individualized normative principles can play in 
assessing conduct during wartime.”111 Finally, Judith Lichtenberg, though “granting 
the arguments” against the equal application doctrine as a general matter, develops 
the claim that the violent acts of some unjust combatants can nonetheless be 
justified.112 
States and jurists, for their parts, approach the doctrine with similar 
ambivalence. As noted above, considerable post-World War II case law supports the 
doctrine. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its blockbuster 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, called the doctrine into question by suggesting 
that, although the use of nuclear weapons was generally inconsistent with jus in bello 
norms, the court could not “reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or 
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illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of 
self-defence, in which its very survival would be at stake.”113 This conclusion blends 
jus in bello and jus ad bellum concerns by suggesting that the legality of a weapon 
under the jus in bello is in some degree contingent on the parties’ jus ad bellum 
status. This feature of the ICJ’s decision garnered considerable criticism,114 but it 
also reflects the ambivalence that we see exhibited by nonlegal scholars and also by 
states. 
To be fair, some states have shown no ambivalence about the equal 
application doctrine but rather have rejected it entirely. During the negotiations 
regarding Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, for example, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam argued that states that committed acts of 
aggression should not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of humanitarian 
law.115 Similarly, it was official doctrine in the Soviet Union that the victim of 
aggression was not bound by humanitarian law.116 Finally, states have frequently 
sought to justify defensive acts that violate jus in bellum norms by invoking their 
opponents’ jus ad bellum violations.117 
Whereas these efforts to blur the distinction between the jus ad bellum and 
the jus in bello can be dismissed as blatantly self-serving, it is unquestionable that 
the equal application doctrine creates legitimate tensions in certain kinds of 
conflicts. Most notably, the doctrine has been called into question in conflicts in 
which the international community clearly favors one of the parties (often because 
the other party has violated the jus ad bellum), and the equality doctrine is viewed 
as hamstringing the favored party’s efforts to prevail in the conflict. The equal 
application doctrine was questioned during the 1970s, for instance, with respect to 
conflicts involving foreign colonial powers and the fighters who sought to overthrow 
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them because the latter operated at such a comparative disadvantage.118 As a 
consequence, Protocol I included provisions that reduced certain jus in bello 
requirements for guerrilla forces fighting against colonial powers in wars of national 
liberation.119 Not surprisingly, these provisions generated considerable controversy 
because they blurred the otherwise strict separation between the jus in bello and the 
jus ad bellum.120 
Adherence to the equal application doctrine also has suffered in more 
recent conflicts where the international community clearly views one party to be 
acting illegally. Consider, for instance, conflicts in which the UN Security Council 
authorizes the use of force to repel an illegal attack. In past decades, some questioned 
whether the equal application doctrine even applied to such conflicts.121 Currently, 
the weight of scholarly opinion suggests that it does;122 however, the practice of 
states may call that conclusion into question. For instance, Judith Gardam examined 
Operation Desert Storm, in which the UN Security Council authorized coalition 
forces to wage war in response to Iraq’s illegal invasion and annexation of Kuwait. 
Admittedly, the coalition forces did not expressly claim authority to deviate from 
jus in bello norms on the basis of their Security Council authorization.123 
Nonetheless, after carefully examining the coalition forces’ actions during the 
conflict, Gardam concludes that they were willing to employ certain legally 
questionable tactics and tolerate large-scale civilian casualties only due to “the 
consensus that Iraq’s action had no legal or moral basis.”124 
Other conflicts that put pressure on the equal application doctrine are clear 
instances of self-defense along with humanitarian interventions. Many 
commentators have suggested, for instance, that the humanitarian goals motivating 
NATO’s 1999 air strikes against Serbia influenced the means by which NATO 
conducted its warfare as well as the international community’s assessment of those 
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means.125 Indeed, Robert Sloane carefully analyzed the tactics used during the 
NATO air campaign, the 2006 Israel/Hezbollah conflict, and the U.S. War on Terror, 
and he concludes that these and other examples “reflect a trend in contemporary 
international law . . . to allow ad bellum considerations to influence and, at times, 
even to vitiate the jus in bello.”126 Sloane maintains that, despite nominal consensus 
regarding the equal application doctrine,  
[I]nternational law tends to tolerate more incidental civilian harm 
(“collateral damage”) if the alleged casus belli is either (1) widely 
perceived as legal (for example, a clear and unassailable case of self-
defense) or (2) formally illegal but still perceived as legitimate, 
meaning that it furthers broadly shared international values: 
preserving minimum order, halting human rights atrocities, and so 
forth.127 
The foregoing suggests that the equal application doctrine enjoys 
widespread theoretical support, but somewhat less actual adherence. This state of 
affairs should not be surprising. On the one hand, the resistance to the equal 
application doctrine is predictable given that philosophers have capably shown that 
the doctrine is inconsistent with ordinary morality.128 It is likewise deeply 
counterintuitive at a basic level. The notion that a state can blatantly violate 
international law by launching a war of aggression—a war that will inevitably cause 
widespread destruction and loss of life—and nonetheless benefit from all the same 
humanitarian law rules that assist the states that must defend against the illegal 
aggression is plainly unsatisfying. Nathanial Berman puts his dissatisfaction thus: 
Personally, I never want Nazis to be privileged combatants, whether 
they are organized as an army of a state or as an insurgent group 
against a democracy. In my view, killing in the name of Nazism 
should never be immunized from the most severe criminal penalties. 
And I always want anti-Nazis to be able to fight Nazis with the 
combatants’ privilege, whether they are organized as a state army, a 
guerrilla force, or individual snipers. But the rules as they are 
currently structured—in their aspiration to separate jus ad bellum 
from jus in bello—seek to block this goal.129 
At the same time, the practical arguments that support the doctrine have 
lost little force since Lauterpacht first articulated them. As recently as 2006, Antoine 
Bouvier simply, yet compellingly, defended the equal application doctrine by 
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invoking two very practical concerns. When asked why the doctrine should be 
maintained, Bouvier said first “because there is no alternative system available!” 
and second “because otherwise IHL simply doesn’t work!”130 As noted above, 
philosophers have sought to bridge the principle/practical divide by advancing 
abstract theories. This Article seeks the same end, but through a much more practical 
means: differential application of post-conflict enforcement. Indeed, although this 
Article does not adopt Judge Thompson’s radical notion that fighting for a just cause 
absolves soldiers from liability for their atrocities, it does breach orthodoxy by 
suggesting that the equality principle should not apply to post-conflict enforcement 
of IHL violations. The following Part develops my proposal. 
II. REFASHIONING THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE: UNEQUAL POST-
CONFLICT ENFORCEMENT OF IHL RULES 
The foregoing description of the historical genesis and current status of the 
equal application doctrine reveals that it stands as a well-established, if distasteful, 
feature of the IHL landscape. It is well established because it appears in case law 
and treaties and has the uniform support of legal scholars and commentators. It is 
distasteful because it is inconsistent with ordinary morality and is counterintuitive 
on its face. It is well established—despite its distastefulness—because its 
elimination would create far more negative consequences than does its continuation. 
In particular, we have reason to believe that its elimination would lead to a 
substantial decline in compliance with IHL rules. These concerns are sufficiently 
troubling—and plausible—that neither scholars nor states wish to abandon the 
doctrine, but states frequently behave in ways that surreptitiously undermine it in 
conflicts where they are convinced that their cause is just. 
Summarizing the previous Part in this way allows us to see that the equal 
application doctrine exists primarily because the international legal system in 
general and the IHL system, in particular, are profoundly underdeveloped. 
Specifically, because the international legal system traditionally has lacked 
systematic enforcement mechanisms, the primary way to motivate states to comply 
with international legal rules has been to reward compliance with reciprocal 
benefits.131 Unequal application of jus in bello norms would eliminate the reciprocal 
benefits that states can expect to receive from their compliance with IHL rules, so 
scholars and commentators assume it thereby would undermine, if not destroy, the 
IHL system as a whole. 
That assumption was a reasonable one when Hersch Lauterpacht first made 
it in 1953, and it is still reasonable today, as lack of adequate enforcement continues 
to bedevil all aspects of the international legal system.132 To be sure, the enforcement 
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of IHL violations has marginally improved in the last 25 years. Domestic 
prosecutions of IHL violations may be more prevalent than they used to be; 
moreover, and as particularly relevant here, the international community has created 
a number of international criminal tribunals to prosecute and punish war crimes, 
along with other international criminal violations.133 However, the establishment of 
these tribunals does not alter the fundamental need for reciprocity to motivate 
compliance with IHL rules.134 As will be discussed below, international criminal 
tribunals can prosecute only a tiny proportion of IHL violators, so their existence 
does not change the basic cost-benefit analysis that maintains the equal application 
doctrine. The introduction of international criminal tribunals can, however, provide 
a morally grounded basis for distinguishing between just and unjust combatants 
without incurring the negative practical consequences that would arise from the 
unequal application of jus in bello rules. That is, this Article suggests that the way 
to bridge the divide between moral principle and practical reality described in Part I 
is through the unequal enforcement of IHL rules. More specifically, this Article 
contends that international criminal tribunals should consider suspects’ jus ad 
bellum/aggressor status when deciding whom to prosecute.135 
To convincingly advance that proposal, this Article must defend or 
establish a number of propositions. First, differentially enforcing substantive rules 
that apply uniformly across classes of persons is generally considered 
inappropriate.136 So, Section A explains why—when it comes to the differential 
enforcement of IHL rules—it is justified. Next, this Article must establish that the 
differential enforcement of IHL rules will not lead to the same negative 
consequences that the differential application of IHL rules would produce. That 
discussion takes place in Section B. There, I acknowledge that some forms of 
differential enforcement would undermine the IHL regulatory system, but I argue 
that an appropriately calibrated differentiation scheme will ameliorate the 
counterintuitive and morally distasteful aspects of the equal application doctrine 
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without reducing adherence to jus in bello rules. Finally, Section C will address two 
potential objections to my proposal. The first addresses the fact that most of the 
violations that have become subject to international criminal prosecutions in recent 
years have taken place during noninternational armed conflicts; that is, during 
conflicts that are not subject to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force or 
other jus ad bellum restrictions. The second considers the way in which likely 
information deficits will complicate efforts to take aggressor status into account in 
prosecutorial allocations. 
A. Preliminary Issues: Justifying Differential Enforcement as an Abstract 
Proposition 
As noted, this Article maintains that even though IHL rules apply in the 
same way to combatants from aggressor states as combatants from defender states, 
when those rules are violated their enforcement should turn in some part on the 
aggressor status of the violator. Before developing that thesis further, however, I 
must acknowledge that any proposal to differentially enforce substantive rules on 
the basis of distinctions that do not appear in the substantive law is a proposal that 
needs justification. Certainly, in most domestic law contexts, there is a presumption 
that, if it is deemed desirable to apply a substantive rule differently to different 
categories of people, then those distinctions should appear in the substantive statute. 
For instance, minors may be exempt from the reach of certain criminal laws, but 
they are exempt not because the criminal laws are not enforced as to them but 
because the substantive laws themselves do not apply to the conduct of minors.137 
In other words, due to the wording of the substantive statutes, the conduct in 
question is criminal if engaged in by some people (adults) but not criminal if 
engaged in by other people (minors). By contrast, if the substantive statute does not 
draw any such distinctions, then it applies equally to all persons within the 
jurisdiction, and we presume that it should be enforced equally against all persons 
within the jurisdiction. Indeed, when generally applicable laws are not enforced 
uniformly against all persons in a domestic legal system, we consider such 
differential enforcement to violate the rule of law138 and (often) antidiscrimination 
norms. If we determine, for instance, that the Internal Revenue Service is targeting 
Republicans for audits,139 or that prosecutors are more likely to indict persons of 
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color,140 then we consider such differential enforcement to be both illegal and 
immoral. 
The differential enforcement of international law rules could give rise to 
the same rule-of-law and antidiscrimination concerns. International law realists 
contend that, in practice, international law is enforced differentially depending on 
the size, wealth, and power of the state in question,141 but scholars and policymakers 
generally try to combat such unequal enforcement, not expand it. Moreover, the 
equal application doctrine itself might seem specifically to argue against differential 
enforcement in the IHL context. After all, the doctrine mandates the equal 
application of jus in bello rules; that is, it mandates that no distinctions be made in 
the application of jus in bello rules on the basis of jus ad bellum status. So, given 
that the whole point of the doctrine is to ensure that both sides to a conflict are 
subject to the same jus in bello rights and obligations, how can it be justifiable to 
treat those parties differently when it comes to enforcing violations of those 
obligations? 
Two answers emerge, both of which stem from the underdeveloped nature 
of the international legal system in general and the rarity of post-conflict 
enforcement of IHL rules in particular. In a domestic law context, a law that applies 
equally across a class of persons does so because the drafters of the law determined 
that there were no relevant distinctions between different classes of persons when it 
comes to the conduct governed by the law. For instance, laws that prohibit driving 
while under the influence of alcohol do not apply differently to male and female 
drivers because, when enacting the law, lawmakers concluded that such distinctions 
were not relevant to the aims they were seeking to achieve with the prohibition. On 
the face of it, the laws of war are similar to such equally applicable domestic laws 
because the laws of war have been determined to apply equally to all combatants. 
However, the reasons for their equal application are entirely different. As just noted, 
in a well-functioning domestic law context, laws that apply equally across classes 
of persons do so because distinctions between persons are considered irrelevant to 
the purposes the laws seek to advance. 
By contrast, when it comes to the laws of war, their equal application stems 
not from a principled determination that no distinctions between the combatants are 
relevant. To the contrary, as Part I recounted, scholars and commentators often 
consider the jus ad bellum status of the combatants to be highly relevant to the 
appropriate application of the jus in bello rules; indeed, philosophers maintain that 
common morality not only permits distinctions in the application of jus in bello rules 
on the basis of their jus ad bellum status but requires them.142 Thus, if the laws of 
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war operated in a well-functioning domestic legal system, they likely would feature 
distinctions based on jus ad bellum status. They do not feature such distinctions, 
however, because international law is not part of a well-functioning legal system; 
that is, a legal system in which appropriate enforcement of violations can be 
presumed. Thus, we have justifiable fears that introducing distinctions—even highly 
relevant ones—will reduce overall compliance with the law. But the fact that 
distinctions among combatants in the application of IHL rules are at least 
theoretically justified (if not preferable) means that their failure to appear in the 
substantive law should not preclude their appearance in enforcement decisions. In 
other words, so long as differential enforcement of IHL rules on the basis of jus ad 
bellum status does not lead to the same untoward practical consequences that the 
differential application of IHL rules would produce, then we need not be worried 
about violating rule-of-law or antidiscrimination norms. Those norms are implicated 
when enforcement authorities contravene the intent of lawmakers to apply rules 
uniformly. When it comes to the laws of war, there is no similar principled 
preference for uniform application, so differential enforcement raises no rule-of-law 
or antidiscrimination concerns. 
Another even more compelling reason that we need have no concerns about 
differential enforcement of IHL rules stems from the scarcity of that enforcement. 
To be sure, recent years have seen a significant increase in international enforcement 
of IHL rules with the creation of various international criminal tribunals. However, 
the sad reality is that these tribunals can prosecute only the tiniest proportion of 
violators. So, whether we like it or not, IHL violations are differentially enforced—
and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Or, put differently, because only 
a small percentage of violations can become subject to any enforcement measures, 
difficult decisions must be made as to which violations they will be. Indeed, a vast 
literature already surrounds case selection at the international tribunals, with some 
scholars recommending the adoption of guidelines for determining how to allocate 
scarce enforcement resources,143 others suggesting that certain penological goals 
should drive case selection,144 and still others explaining case selection on the basis 
of realpolitik factors.145 However, even though scholars disagree about which 
principles do and should guide the allocation of enforcement measures, they all 
                                                                                                                
 143. See, e.g., Avril McDonald & Roelof Haveman, Prosecutorial Discretion—
Some Thoughts on ‘Objectifying’ the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion by the Prosecutor 
of the ICC, ICC-OTP, at 5 (Apr. 15, 2003), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/mcdonald_haveman.pdf; Allison Marston 
Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 510 (2003); Philippa Webb, The ICC 
Prosecutor’s Discretion Not to Proceed in the “Interests of Justice,” 50 CRIM. L. Q. 305 
(2005). 
 144. See, e.g., Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive 
Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2012) (advocating 
emphasis on expressivism in case selection). 
 145. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 5, at 745; Cale Davis, Political Considerations 
in Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 15 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 170, 
176–78 (2015) (arguing that ICC prosecutors should take political considerations into account 
when deciding which situations to investigate and which cases to prosecute). 
2019] UNEQUAL ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 181 
recognize that the scarcity of enforcement necessitates the adoption of some process 
or principle to guide its allocation. In other words, I have not yet made the case that 
the aggressor status of combatants should be a factor relevant in determining whom 
to prosecute, but there is no question that some factors must be consulted and that 
some differential enforcement of IHL violations must occur. The only question is 
on what basis it should occur. In the following Sections, I will develop the claim 
that one relevant basis is the aggressor status of the defendant’s party to the 
conflict.146 
B. Equal Application but Unequal Enforcement: Obtaining the Benefits Without 
the Costs 
As we have seen, the equal application doctrine persists largely because we 
are convinced that the unequal application of jus in bello rules would lead to more 
jus in bello violations and would generally undermine the IHL regulatory system.147 
In this Article, I propose retaining the equal application of jus in bello rules but 
differentially enforcing violations of those rules. However, my proposal is beneficial 
only if it does not produce the same negative consequences that the differential 
application of jus in bello rules would produce. 
What sort of consequences will result from the unequal enforcement of jus 
in bello rules depends on the level of inequality that the enforcement system 
practices. Assume, for instance, an enforcement scheme that prosecuted only 
combatants whose party was the aggressor in the conflict.148 If that were the only 
enforcement scheme available to punish IHL violators in that conflict, then we might 
reasonably fear that it would generate most of the same unfortunate results that 
would ensue if we eliminated the equal application doctrine because such an 
enforcement scheme, if known ahead of time, would be tantamount to eliminating 
the equal application doctrine.149 That is, an enforcement scheme that can be utilized 
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against only one party to the conflict in effect exempts the other party from the reach 
of the substantive rules governing the conflict. Because such an exemption 
effectively eliminates the equal application doctrine, we can expect it to produce 
most, if not all, of the negative consequences that the equal application doctrine is 
designed to prevent. 
For that reason, along with others, we would not want an enforcement 
regime that wholly exempted from prosecution combatants from defending parties. 
But what about an enforcement regime that did not exempt those combatants but 
rather prosecuted a smaller proportion of them as compared with combatants of 
aggressor parties? Or, in the terminology of international criminal law case 
selection, what if an international tribunal treated a suspect’s aggressor status as one 
among a series of factors weighing in favor of the suspect’s prosecution? That sort 
of partially differentiated enforcement scheme is far less likely to reduce compliance 
with IHL rules. We expect that compliance with IHL rules will plummet if those 
rules are determined not to apply to one party to the conflict because that party will 
not comply with the rules, and its opponent will be far less likely to comply because 
its soldiers will not reap any reciprocal benefits from their compliance. But if the 
rules continued to apply to both parties, and if the enforcement scheme did subject 
defenders to some prosecutions—albeit at a lower rate than that applied to 
aggressors—then we should expect little or no impact on compliance with jus in 
bello rules. Already, combatants know that post-conflict punishment of violations is 
rare. Therefore, so long as defenders recognize that they remain vulnerable to 
prosecution, the specifics of the enforcement regime are not likely to substantially 
impact their decisions regarding compliance with jus in bello rules. Said differently, 
we reasonably fear that combatants will systematically ignore jus in bello rules when 
those rules apply only to one party to the conflict or when the rules are self-evidently 
enforced against only one party to the conflict. But an enforcement scheme that 
applies to both parties but allocates a higher proportion of prosecutions to one of 
those parties should not substantially reduce either party’s compliance with jus in 
bello rules. The desire for reciprocity will continue to motivate some compliance, as 
will the fear of enforcement mechanisms. Admittedly, that fear should be somewhat 
reduced when it comes to defenders, but because combatants have no way to 
accurately assess their risk of punishment ex ante, any differential in enforcement is 
not apt to encourage violations. To analogize to the domestic context, studies show 
that African Americans are disproportionately prosecuted for drug offenses as 
compared with Caucasian Americans, but we have no reason to believe that 
Caucasians are consequently more likely to violate the drug laws as a result of that 
differential. 
That differential enforcement can be practiced without undermining 
compliance with jus in bello rules should make it attractive to many scholars who 
have previously held their noses while endorsing the equal application doctrine. In 
particular, legal scholars who support the equal application doctrine because they 
fear undermining IHL compliance should approve of my proposal because it will 
                                                                                                                
party from international criminal prosecution does not provide the same assurances as 
exempting the party from application of the rules themselves, it likely provides enough 
assurances to severely undermine compliance with IHL rules. 
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not cause the negative practical consequences they seek to avoid. Likewise, my 
proposal should gain the support of philosophy scholars who deem the equal 
application doctrine inconsistent with ordinary morality because my proposal 
distinguishes between unjust and just combatants in just the way that those scholars 
deem morally required. Finally, at a functional level, my proposal charts a more 
morally intuitive and practically feasible course than the proposals of previous 
scholars who have called the equal application doctrine into question. 
Indeed, some philosophers take their critique of the equal application 
doctrine to its logical conclusion, which can lead to troubling proposals. For 
instance, some philosophers who oppose the equal application doctrine maintain that 
the laws of war should provide defender combatants with more rights than aggressor 
combatants: Jeff McMahan and Richard Arneson, in particular, argue that defender 
combatants should be entitled to target the civilians of aggressor states for attack.150 
Other scholars, such as David Rodin and Christopher Kutz, stop short of advocating 
additional rights for defender combatants (to target civilians, for instance) but rather 
suggest eliminating certain rights that the equal application doctrine bestows on 
aggressor combatants.151 Specifically, jus in bello rules bestow on combatants the 
privilege of attacking opposing combatants,152 and pursuant to the equal application 
doctrine, aggressor as well as defender combatants possess this privilege. However, 
Rodin would eliminate the combatants’ privilege for aggressor combatants and 
would consequently subject them to post-bellum punishment for killing opposing 
combatants during warfare.153 
Proposals such as these from the philosophical literature are theoretically 
defensible, and in fact, flow directly from their authors’ justified critiques of the 
equal application doctrine. Yet they have little to recommend them in practice. 
Permitting the targeting of civilians is problematic even when confined to the 
specific and limited circumstances that some scholars delineate, because 
information is hard to come by during warfare and combatants always call doubts in 
their own favor. Thus, any incursion on the prohibition against targeting civilians 
will inevitably lead to a substantial increase in innocent civilian deaths. Likewise, 
proposals to hold combatants from aggressor states responsible for the deaths of all 
enemy combatants may have theoretical merit, but they face insurmountable 
logistical difficulties.154 Not least, in a world in which the vast majority of mass 
                                                                                                                
 150. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Just Warfare Theory and Noncombatant 
Immunity, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 663, 670 (2006). Jeff McMahan, for his part, contends that 
civilians can be targeted for an attack if they “bear a high degree of responsibility for a wrong 
that constitutes a just cause for war, if attacking them would make a substantial contribution 
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harm to those who are genuinely innocent.” McMahan, The Morality of War, supra note 98, 
at 22; see also McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, supra note 98, at 725–29. For a 
rebuttal of this position and a compelling defense of the position that killing noncombatants 
is almost always worse than killing combatants, see SETH LAZAR, SPARING CIVILIANS (2015). 
 151. See, e.g., Rodin, supra note 7, at 44–45; Kutz, supra note 23, at 72. 
 152. Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants, ICRC, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2019). 
 153. Rodin, supra note 7, at 45; see also Arneson, supra note 150, at 674. 
 154. See, e.g., Kutz, supra note 23, at 74; Lichtenberg, supra note 107, at 129. 
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atrocities perpetrated against self-evidently innocent civilians go unsanctioned, 
there is no reason to believe that resources will materialize to prosecute and punish 
combatants from aggressor states for nothing more than attacking opposing 
combatants from defending states. My proposal has all of the advantages of the 
philosophers’ proposals, but it is eminently more feasible in the world in which we 
actually live. My proposal, like those of the philosophers, is consistent with ordinary 
moral intuitions because it draws the distinction that those intuitions require—
between combatants fighting for aggressor parties and combatants fighting in 
defense against aggression. However, my proposal is eminently more feasible than 
those of the philosophers because it draws the relevant distinctions between the two 
groups only in the realm of enforcement, a realm in which severe scarcity compels 
us to draw some distinctions whether we want to or not. 
This Section has shown that unequally enforcing IHL violations is not 
likely to lead to the deleterious consequences that require us to equally apply jus in 
bello rules. The following Section, however, addresses two possible objections to 
my proposal. 
C. Addressing Potential Objections: Noninternational Armed Conflicts and 
Information Deficits 
In Part III, I will develop my proposal in more detail, but here I highlight 
two possible objections or concerns. The first pertains to the reach of my proposal. 
As noted in Part I, the equal application doctrine arose only after international law 
prohibited the use of armed force. Indeed, it was the ability to label one party to a 
conflict an illegal aggressor that generated the first calls for the unequal application 
of jus in bello rules. However, those use-of-force restrictions apply only to interstate 
conflicts, and indeed the equal application doctrine and the copious scholarship 
surrounding it contemplate conflicts between two states. For that reason, it goes 
without saying that my proposal to differentially enforce jus in bello rules is intended 
to apply to jus in bello violations occurring during international armed conflicts. But 
should it also apply to jus in bello violations occurring during noninternational 
armed conflicts? The question is an important one because the majority of jus in 
bello violations that have become subject to international criminal prosecutions in 
recent years have occurred during noninternational armed conflicts.155 
A reasonable argument can be made that my proposal should be limited to 
the enforcement of jus in bello violations in international armed conflicts precisely 
because it is only in international armed conflicts that we have a legal basis on which 
to distinguish between combatants. That basis for distinguishing—the UN’s use-of-
force prohibition—simply does not apply to combatants in noninternational armed 
conflicts.156 Thus, because it is not illegal under IHL to launch a noninternational 
armed conflict, there is no illegal aggressor among the parties to a noninternational 
                                                                                                                
 155. See Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 689 (2015) 
(reporting that “[o]f the 254 armed conflicts recorded between 1946 and 2013 by a leading 
database, only twenty-four have been categorized as interstate conflicts, while a staggering 
number of 153 intrastate conflicts were recorded” and the rest were mixed conflicts). 
 156. See Jens David Ohlin, The Common Law of War, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
493, 520 (2016). 
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armed conflict, and there is no jus ad bellum status on which to base differential 
enforcement. 
Although that argument has surface appeal, I maintain that my proposal 
can and should also be applied to IHL violations occurring during noninternational 
armed conflicts. Noninternational armed conflicts admittedly are exempt from the 
UN Charter’s use-of-force prohibition, but their exemption stems not from a 
principled determination that launching a civil war should be legal under 
international law but from states’ traditional (and much criticized) unwillingness to 
relinquish their sovereign prerogatives.157 Thus, we should not view the 
international community’s failure to extend the use-of-force prohibition to 
noninternational armed conflicts as its endorsement of the current legal regime. 
Rather, the distinction in legal treatment between international and noninternational 
armed conflicts simply reflects the prevailing political realities. Moreover, the equal 
application doctrine is unjustified not primarily because it fails to draw relevant 
legal distinctions between combatants, but because it fails to draw relevant moral 
distinctions. Indeed, the philosophers who oppose the equal application doctrine 
generally make no reference to legal standards158 but instead claim that the moral 
distinction between aggressors and defenders justifies (if not requires) the 
application of different rules governing the conduct of hostilities.159 
Thus, although a party to a noninternational armed conflict is not acting 
illegally when it launches the conflict, it may well be acting wrongfully—in the 
ordinary moral sense. Few would dispute, for instance, that the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) was a wrongful aggressor when it initiated the brutal civil war 
in Sierra Leone by “terroriz[ing] the villages of Bomaru and Sienga.”160 Likewise, 
                                                                                                                
 157. Most discussions of these sovereignty concerns relate to states’ reluctance to 
extend jus in bello regulations to noninternational armed conflicts. See, e.g., Dapo Akande & 
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Lieber Code and the Regulation of Civil War in International 
Law, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 638, 645–47 (2015); Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. 
Farley, Identifying the Start of Conflict: Conflict Recognition, Operational Realities, and 
Accountability in the Post-9/11 World, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467, 483–86 (2015); Drew R. 
Atkins, Customary International Humanitarian Law and Multinational Military Operations 
in Malaysia, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 79, 83–85 (2007). States have little need to press for 
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 158. See, e.g., Tom Dannenbaum, Why Have We Criminalized Aggressive War, 126 
YALE L.J. 1242, 1258 (2017) (noting that Christopher Kutz “does not link []his moral theory 
to the law”). 
 159. See supra Part I. 
 160. Peter Penfold, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis, in 
RESCUING A FRAGILE STATE: SIERRA LEONE 2002–2008, 53, 59 (Lansana Gberie ed., 2009); 
see also REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WITNESS TO TRUTH, Vol. 
2, Chapter 2, ¶¶ 69–74 (2004) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT]; Lansana Gberie, 
War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and Lebanese Connection, at 2, 3, 
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it is incontestable that Bosnian Serbs acted (morally) wrongfully when they initiated 
the civil war in that country by launching attacks against Bosnian Croats and 
Muslims following the 1991 independence referendum.161 In fact, it was the Serbs’ 
aggression in the Bosnian war that motivated legal scholar Ruth Wedgwood to 
advocate extending the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force to 
noninternational armed conflicts,162 and other scholars have made similar 
observations and proposals.163 Indeed, Eliav Lieblich recently advanced a novel 
theory of “internal jus ad bellum”; that is, a law governing the use of force that can 
be applied to both governments and opposition groups engaged in noninternational 
armed conflicts.164 In sum, although salient distinctions unquestionably can be 
drawn between the launching of an international and a noninternational armed 
conflict, those distinctions are largely irrelevant for the purposes of my proposal. In 
particular, to the extent that we consider it justified to weigh aggressor status in favor 
of prosecutions, then it should weigh in favor of prosecutions for violations of jus in 
bello rules occurring during both international and noninternational armed conflicts. 
The second concern that I anticipate relates to our ability to determine 
which party is the aggressor in a given conflict. In particular, if an international 
tribunal is going to take aggressor status into account when determining whom to 
prosecute, then it must have sufficient facts about the conflict and the parties’ actions 
therein to be able to identify aggressors with reasonable confidence. We have good 
                                                                                                                
(2017), https://impacttransform.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2002-Nov-War-and-Peace-
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 161. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, 
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“A Closed Dark Place”: Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (July 1, 1998), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/foca/. 
 162. Ruth Wedgwood, The Use of Force in Civil Disputes, ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN 
RIGHTS 239, 245 (1996). 
 163. See, e.g., Kirsti Samuels, Jus Ad Bellum and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of 
the International Community’s Approach to Violence in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 8 J. 
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 315, 315 (2003) (suggesting that the international community’s practice 
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to violence in internal disputes”); Bugnion, supra note 11; Lieblich, supra note 155; Nico 
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https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WebPageSchrijver_UseofForce.pdf. These 
proposals are also consistent with scholarship advocating recognition of the third-generation 
human right to peace. For a discussion of that right, see DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE HUMAN RIGHT 
TO PEACE (2003); Patrick Hayden, A Defense of Peace as a Human Right, 21 S. AFRICAN J. 
PHIL. 147 (2002). 
 164. See generally Lieblich, supra note 155. 
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reason to fear that it will not. Accurate information—about all subjects—is hard to 
come by during warfare.165 Moreover, accurate information about aggressor status 
may be particularly difficult to acquire. As noted in Part I, most warring parties label 
their opponents aggressors and proclaim themselves to be acting in self-defense.166 
Some such claims are patently ridiculous,167 but others raise close questions, 
particularly while the conflict is ongoing. The United States, for instance, suggested 
that its 2003 invasion of Iraq could be justified as self-defense, ostensibly to 
eliminate the threat from weapons of mass destruction.168 Some commentators found 
that claim persuasive,169 whereas others accused the United States of violating jus 
ad bellum norms.170 And the subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction 
added further complexity to the analysis.171 
The difficulty of ascertaining facts relevant to determining aggressor status 
is exacerbated by the vagueness and contentiousness that have historically 
surrounded the standards governing the initiation of warfare. Selecting a standard 
by which to measure aggressor status is itself a controversial proposition, and it is a 
question that I will examine in considerable detail in a future work.172 Suffice it to 
say here that when determining whether a party is an aggressor for purposes of 
prosecutorial allocations, the tribunals might look to the UN Charter’s use-of-force 
rules or the ICC’s newly minted definition of “aggression.”173 Or they might eschew 
existing legal standards altogether and instead apply a standard informed more 
                                                                                                                
 165. See Frederiek de Vlaming, Selection of Defendants, in INTERNATIONAL 
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Just Pre-emptive War, Just Humanitarian Intervention?, 51 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 77, 104 
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 172. In a future publication, I will provide a detailed examination of the 
implementation of my proposal and additionally will consider its application to sentencing. 
 173. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 bis, July 17, 1998 
U.N.T.S. 38544 (entered into force July 1, 2002).  
188 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61:155 
directly by ordinary morality.174 But whatever standard is selected will be difficult 
to apply—and particularly so at an early stage in the prosecution. The UN’s use-of-
force rules are notoriously contested,175 for instance, and the ICC’s definition of 
aggression has not yet come into force, let alone been applied in an actual case.176 
The foregoing suggests that considering the parties’ aggressor status in 
prosecutorial allocation decisions will be factually and legally fraught in many 
cases. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that prosecutors will be unable to consider 
aggressor status in their case selection decisions in some cases because that status 
will not be ascertainable with sufficient certainty. However, just because it might be 
difficult, or even impossible, to determine which party was the aggressor in some 
conflicts does not mean that aggressor status should be ignored where the 
determination is straightforward. Admittedly, the provenance of the conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is complex and uncertain,177 but the provenance 
of the conflict in Bosnia is far less so; thus, there is no reason to ignore the aggressor 
status of the Serbs even if we may be unable to ascertain that of the Hema and Lendu 
with sufficient certainty. Finally, the fact that enforcement of IHL violations 
typically occurs long after the conflict has come to an end178 is apt to ameliorate 
information deficiencies to some degree. 
III. INTRODUCING AGGRESSOR STATUS TO CASE SELECTION AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
In the previous Parts, I have advocated weighing aggressor status as a factor 
in favor of prosecutions when enforcement resources are scarce, and difficult 
selection decisions must, in any event, be made. My proposal constitutes a 
substantial contribution to the scholarly discussion surrounding the equal 
application doctrine because it provides a practically feasible path between 
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supporters of the doctrine—who fear the deleterious consequences that would attend 
its elimination—and its critics. But in order to comprehensively evaluate my 
proposal, we must also explore its impact on the work of the bodies that prosecute 
grave IHL violations. For many centuries, when any post-conflict punishment 
occurred at all, the punishment was imposed by the victors against their 
vanquished,179 so the difficult case selection questions that will be discussed here 
did not arise. One-sided prosecutions of IHL violations still take place in many 
domestic criminal justice systems,180 but in recent years, international criminal 
tribunals have been created with jurisdiction over both parties to the relevant 
conflict.181 However, these tribunals must determine how to allocate their scarce 
prosecutorial resources among a too-large body of cases. In this Part, I show that 
taking account of aggressor status in prosecutorial allocation decisions is not only 
consistent with the precedent and practice governing case selection at these 
international tribunals, but it also has the potential to improve those practices in both 
tangible and intangible ways. 
Section A explores the way in which my proposal would interact with 
existing law and practice on case selection at the international criminal tribunals. It 
shows that taking account of aggressor status fits easily within that body of law. 
Section B makes the normative case for considering aggressor status in prosecutorial 
allocation decisions. It maintains that disproportionally prosecuting aggressors not 
only accords with our moral intuitions but also has the potential to enhance the 
tribunals’ ability to advance some of their most compelling goals. 
A. Exploring Current Case Selection Practices at the International Criminal 
Tribunals 
Over the last 25 years, the international community has created several ad 
hoc international tribunals and a permanent international criminal court, and it has 
charged these bodies with prosecuting grave violations of IHL, among other 
international crimes.182 However, unlike domestic criminal justice systems, which 
are expected to prosecute all serious crimes within their jurisdictions, these 
international tribunals have the resources to prosecute only a very small proportion 
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of such crimes.183 So, one of the most important—and controversial—tasks that the 
international tribunals must perform is case selection. Specifically, the tribunals 
must determine which crimes and defendants to prosecute among a sea of “worthy” 
contenders.184 My analysis of the equal application doctrine, appearing in previous 
Parts, has led me to propose that enforcement of IHL violations be allocated 
unequally between aggressors and defenders. Because I do not advocate a ban on 
the prosecution of defenders, then in practical terms, I am suggesting that 
international tribunals weigh the aggressor status of their suspects as a factor in favor 
of their prosecution. 
My proposal is a novel one, in that the international tribunals have not, up 
until now, expressly considered aggressor status when making prosecutorial 
allocations; however, this Section shows that their law and precedents 
unquestionably allow them to do so. In particular, although all of the international 
tribunals were established by statutes that delineate their various jurisdictions,185 
neither those statutes nor any other positive law provides much guidance on how—
and against whom—those jurisdictions should be exercised. As a consequence, 
international tribunal prosecutors have had virtually limitless discretion in 
determining whom to charge. Occasionally, defense counsel have claimed that the 
prosecution abused its discretion by engaging in discriminatory or selective 
prosecutions, but these claims have uniformly been rejected.186 The tribunals have 
thereby maintained expansive prosecutorial discretion in case selection. 
Although tribunal prosecutors possess virtually unfettered legal discretion 
to select cases, their case selection decisions are nonetheless constrained by political 
realities, and those constraints should be expressly acknowledged. At present, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) are providing a 
particularly blatant, real-time example of case selection that is dramatically 
constrained by the political desires of the state where the crime took place,187 but it 
is by no means the only tribunal to have faced such challenges. Indeed, although the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY’s) first 
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prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, may have desired to advance any number of 
theoretically consistent, empirically grounded case selection principles when he 
assumed his position at the ICTY, his practical choices were significantly limited by 
the fact that his tribunal was established during an ongoing conflict, which prevented 
him from conducting on-site investigations.188 Given these political realities, 
Goldstone understandably focused his early indictments against lower-level 
suspects who were already in custody.189 The same political constraints did not exist 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), however, so the same 
Prosecutor—Richard Goldstone—was immediately able to indict high-level 
members of the ousted Rwandan government allegedly responsible for the 
genocide.190 At the same time, the new Tutsi-led government of Rwanda effectively 
blocked the ICTR from issuing indictments against members of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) who allegedly killed tens of thousands of Hutu as they won 
the war and stopped the genocide.191 This discussion serves to acknowledge, 
therefore, that a tribunal’s ability to consider aggressor status, or any other factor in 
case selection, will always be subject to the political forces that invariably shape and 
constrain the relevant tribunals’ operations. 
Because the ICC is the only extant international tribunal currently engaged 
in substantial case selection, its law and practice deserve a closer examination. 
However, that examination reveals that, although the ICC’s jurisdictional and 
admissibility requirements are considerably more complex than those of the ad hoc 
tribunals, they provide the prosecution no additional guidance on case selection, nor 
do they impose additional restrictions on the ICC Prosecutor’s discretion to select 
defendants and cases from those situations that are before the court.192 At the same 
time, the ICC’s prosecutors have been somewhat more transparent than the 
prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals about the principles that underlie their selection 
of cases.193 A brief look at those principles confirms that they allow for significant 
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prosecutorial discretion and therefore would easily accommodate my proposal to 
weigh aggressor status in favor of prosecutions. 
In September 2016, the ICC’s Prosecutor issued a policy paper on case 
selection, and therein she identified “gravity” as the prosecution’s predominant case 
selection criterion.194 According to the policy paper, the gravity of a crime includes 
both quantitative and qualitative elements and is assessed by evaluating, among 
other things, the scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact of the crimes.195 
The policy paper provides a summary description of each of these factors, but even 
a cursory examination of these descriptions shows that they do not constrain the 
Prosecutor’s discretion in any meaningful way. For one thing, the Prosecutor could 
withdraw the policy paper or abandon the criteria it identifies at any time. But even 
if the Prosecutor continues ostensibly to adhere to the standards set out in the policy 
paper, she still retains the freedom to charge whomever she pleases because those 
standards do not restrict her choices in any way. Indeed, in many cases, the policy 
paper does not even provide much guidance. For instance, it states that the “scale” 
of a crime may be assessed in light of, among other things, the crimes’ “geographical 
or temporal spread (high intensity of the crimes over a brief period or low intensity 
of crimes over an extended period).”196 But it offers no opinion on whether the 
Prosecutor should prioritize cases involving a brief, high-intensity set of crimes over 
cases involving a longer-lasting, low-intensity set of crimes or vice versa. Moreover, 
the policy paper is silent regarding the way in which various factors should weigh 
against one another when one points toward the prosecution of one set of crimes or 
defendants, and another points toward the prosecution of another set of crimes or 
defendants. For instance, the policy paper indicates that the Prosecutor should 
consider the vulnerability of victims when selecting cases and defendants,197 but it 
also suggests that the Prosecutor should consider the number of victims.198 Yet, the 
paper provides no guidance as to whether to prioritize crimes featuring a larger 
number of less vulnerable victims over crimes featuring a smaller number of more 
vulnerable victims or vice versa. 
More broadly, the policy paper sheds no light on any of the most 
compelling questions that international criminal law scholars and commentators 
repeatedly raise about case selection. Should prosecutors prioritize traditionally 
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under-prosecuted crimes, such as those involving sexual violence, at the expense of 
crimes that arguably feature greater and more lasting harm, such as murder?199 
Should prosecutors always prioritize the prosecution of defendants whose crimes 
primarily target persons over defendants whose crimes primarily target property, 
even if the relevant property holds tremendous cultural and historical 
significance?200 How should prosecutors allocate cases when both parties to the 
conflict committed crimes but one side committed a disproportionate share of the 
gravest crimes?201 And finally, what is the case selection relevance of a suspect’s 
official position or status?202 The policy paper, citing the ICC Regulations, instructs 
the Prosecutor to ensure that charges are brought “against those persons who appear 
to be the most responsible for the identified crimes,” but the same paragraph goes 
on to authorize prosecutions against low-level, mid-level, and high-level offenders, 
depending on the circumstances.203 
Although the foregoing description of the ICC’s pronouncements on case 
selection might appear critical, I am in fact keenly aware of and sympathetic to the 
difficult value judgments that case selection requires. Thus, the conclusion I derive 
from an examination of the ICC’s policy paper is not that the policy paper should 
have reached hard, pat answers to the questions that have vexed international 
criminal law scholars and commentators for decades. Rather, I maintain only that 
the proposal I advance in this Article fits comfortably within the existing law and 
practice of the ICC. As my description of the policy paper amply shows, the ICC’s 
multifaceted notion of gravity is sufficiently flexible and capacious to encompass 
consideration of a suspect’s aggressor status, among other factors. 
B. The Normative Case for Considering Aggressor Status When Allocating 
International Criminal Prosecutions 
The previous Section revealed that the laws and precedents of the 
international tribunals permit them to consider aggressor status as a factor weighing 
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in favor of prosecutions. In this Section, I advance a series of normative arguments 
for doing so. These arguments rely on psychology research, domestic criminal law 
practice, and the aims driving international criminal prosecutions, among other 
things. This body of law, practice, and scholarship together suggests that we can 
improve international criminal law case selection by including aggressor status 
among the factors that prosecutors consider when deciding whom to prosecute. 
Subsection 1 of this Section harkens back to the earlier pages of this Article and 
presents the primary and most obvious reason to weigh aggressor status in favor of 
prosecutions; namely, it is consistent with our moral intuitions to prosecute a larger 
proportion of defendants committing crimes on behalf of aggressors than defendants 
committing crimes on behalf of defenders. Subsection 2 suggests that putting that 
intuition into practice may enhance international criminal law’s ability to advance 
many of its penological goals. 
1. Case Selection and our Moral Intuitions 
Although this Section is billed as presenting the normative case for 
weighing aggressor status in favor of prosecutions, in fact, much of that case has 
already been made in the earlier parts of this Article. In particular, our survey of 
revisionist philosophical literature in Part I showed that the equal application of jus 
in bello rules is inconsistent with principles of ordinary morality because a party’s 
goals in initiating warfare are morally relevant to the way in which the rules 
governing the conduct of warfare should apply to that party. Although these 
philosophical insights are largely uncontested, they have not carried the day because 
the unequal application of jus in bello rules—in the real-world context in which 
those rules operate—would undermine and maybe destroy the IHL system as a 
whole. 
Indeed, it is as a result of those concerns that I have proposed differentially 
enforcing jus in bello rules on the basis of aggressor status because that level of 
differentiation can be accomplished without incurring the deleterious practical 
consequences that would attend the differential application of those rules. But the 
normative insights that underlie proposals to unequally apply jus in bello rules just 
as compellingly support my proposal to unequally enforce jus in bello rules. In other 
words, if ordinary moral principles support the unequal application of jus in bello 
rules, they will likewise support the unequal enforcement of those rules. 
We need not rest our normative conclusions about ordinary morality solely 
on the realm of abstract moral philosophy, however, because numerous psychology 
studies, along with the real-world experiences of a variety of criminal justice 
systems, provide additional support for the philosophers’ conclusions. Turning first 
to the psychology studies, we find that a large body of research shows that people 
evaluate whether violence is justified largely by means of the ends to which that 
violence is aimed; specifically, people consider the use of force to be most justified 
when it is used to repel a violent attack and least justified when it is employed 
aggressively.204 Indeed, the findings of this research are so robust and consistent 
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across various countries and cultures that one of the leading scholars in this field 
suggests that the relevant moral intuitions—including the comparatively high 
acceptance of the use of force in response to provocation—“may have some 
biological roots”205 or reflect a “universal moral code, common to all humanity.”206 
This psychology research then, considered together with the philosophical literature 
detailed in Part I, compellingly suggests that disproportionately enforcing IHL rules 
against aggressors accords with ordinary moral intuitions. 
These intuitions manifest themselves not only in the pages of scholarly 
journals but also in criminal justice systems throughout the world. For instance, 
prosecutors in domestic criminal justice systems often elect not to prosecute those 
who used violence ostensibly in self-defense, even when the putative defendant’s 
belief in the need for self-defense was erroneous or the use of force was excessive.207 
In making these decisions, prosecutors may be motivated by the moral intuitions 
discussed throughout this Article, but even if they themselves are not, they know 
that juries will be. Time and again, jurors have refused to convict defendants who 
seemingly used excessive or unnecessary force against those who threatened 
them.208 Indeed, the American public—and its legislative representatives—is so 
opposed to punishing those who have any arguable claim of self-defense that recent 
years have seen the widespread and enthusiastic enactment of “Stand Your Ground” 
laws.209 These laws not only expand the right to use force in defense of one’s person 
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and property,210 but they also provide immunity from arrest and prosecution for 
those with even a colorable self-defense claim.211 As Renee Lettow Lerner observed, 
prosecutions of those who claim self-defense are rare in any event, but Stand Your 
Ground advocates “want no risk of them at all.”212 And the immunity provisions 
embedded in Stand Your Ground laws have in fact largely eliminated that risk.213 
Citizens of other countries have also sought to expand their rights of self-defense. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, widespread public outrage greeted the 
prosecution of a Norfolk man who shot and killed a 16-year-old burglar—as he was 
fleeing—and spurred efforts to enact a new, more expansive right of self-defense.214 
Belgians likewise have lodged vehement opposition when prosecutors have brought 
charges against defendants who engaged in arguably excessive uses of force.215 
The moral intuitions that drove the expansion of domestic self-defense 
rules and grants of immunity have also been on display at the international criminal 
courts, and most notably, at the SCSL, which prosecuted international crimes that 
occurred during Sierra Leone’s decade-long civil war.216 It is widely accepted that 
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RUF rebels both began the Sierra Leonean war217 and committed the majority of the 
heinous crimes that occurred during that conflict.218 Another group, the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), committed fewer crimes219 but was also 
implicated in some of the worst brutality of the war.220 Because the SCSL had the 
capacity to indict only a handful of defendants,221 it would have been eminently 
justified in prosecuting only RUF fighters or both RUF and AFRC fighters. Instead, 
in an effort to eliminate any appearance of bias,222 the SCSL Prosecutor chose to 
indict three leaders of the RUF, three leaders of the AFRC, and three leaders of the 
Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the group that had been formed to defend against the 
rebel attacks.223 The Prosecutor’s aims may have been laudable, but his indictments 
against the CDF defendants proved intensely unpopular224 and delegitimized the 
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tribunal with much of the country.225 Although most Sierra Leoneans acknowledged 
that CDF fighters committed some international crimes,226 they nonetheless opposed 
their prosecution because the CDF committed those crimes in an effort to defend the 
country against rebel attacks and restore Sierra Leone’s democratically elected 
government.227 Indeed, opposition to the CDF indictments was so intense that the 
SCSL was forced to undertake special security measures when detaining the lead 
CDF defendant, Sam Hinga Norman, because it reasonably feared that his detention 
could lead former CDF fighters to take up arms.228 To be sure, some international 
human rights groups praised the Prosecutor’s strategy as showing that no one is 
above the law,229 but the overwhelmingly negative local reaction to the indictments 
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showed that most Sierra Leoneans did not want prosecutions to be allocated equally 
across all warring parties and, in particular, did not want any prosecutions for those 
who had committed crimes while defending their country against attacks. 
It was not only victims and local communities that viewed the CDF 
indictments through this moral lens but also a sizable component of the SCSL 
judiciary. As noted in the Introduction, Sierra Leonean Judge Thompson voted to 
acquit the CDF defendants because they committed their crimes while defending 
their country.230 The remaining two (non-Sierra Leonean) trial judges recognized 
that laudable aims are not a defense to international crimes, so they voted to convict 
the defendants, but they imposed very lenient sentences,231 swayed by precisely the 
same factors that led Judge Thompson to believe the defendants should be acquitted. 
Specifically, the majority considered it highly relevant to sentencing that the 
defendants were “defending a cause that was palpably just and defendable.”232 
Indeed, although the Trial Chamber labeled the CDF crimes “grave and very 
serious,” it concluded that, by defeating the rebels who had ousted the legitimate 
government, the CDF had “in a sense, atone[d] for this vice” and “contributed 
immensely to reestablishing the rule of law in this country where criminality, 
anarchy and lawlessness . . . had become the order of the day.”233 Admittedly, the 
SCSL Appeals Chamber subsequently increased the sentences of the CDF 
defendants and specifically rejected the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the justness 
of the defendants’ cause constituted a mitigating factor,234 but the Sierra Leonean 
Justice on the Appeals Chamber dissented on this point,235 and the sentence 
increases led to further resentment and disillusionment in local communities.236 
Indeed, the fact that a majority of the SCSL judiciary considered the defendants’ 
just cause to be highly relevant to their convictions and sentences demonstrates the 
power of the moral intuitions under discussion. 
To be sure, the negative local reaction that greeted the SCSL indictments 
of defending combatants was likely driven not only by the moral intuition that 
defenders should be held to a different standard than aggressors but also by the fact 
that the aggressors committed a far greater number of crimes than the defenders. 
                                                                                                                
impartially and independently to prosecute serious crimes.”); PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra 
note 228, at 5–6 (quoting the National Chairman of the War-affected Amputees Association 
who praised the CDF indictments); Jalloh, supra note 225, at 426. 
 230. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14J, Separate Concurring and 
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article 18 
of the Statute, ¶¶ 62–97 (Aug. 2, 2007). 
 231. Fofana was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment whereas Kondewa was 
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14J, 
Judgement on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, Disposition  
(Oct. 9, 2007). 
 232. Id. ¶ 86. 
 233. Id. ¶ 87. 
 234. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 534 (May 28, 
2008). 
 235. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Partially Dissenting Opinion 
of Honorable Justice George Gelaga King, ¶¶ 26–31 (May 28, 2008). 
 236. See, e.g., You Said It, supra note 225. 
200 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 61:155 
That said, the moral intuitions we have been discussing are unquestionably 
powerful, and prosecutors ignore them at their peril. The following Subsection 
examines the way that taking account of those intuitions can assist international 
criminal tribunals in advancing their goals. 
2. Unequal Enforcement as a Means of Enhancing International Criminal 
Law’s Ability to Advance its Penological Goals 
The previous Subsection suggests that international criminal prosecutors 
should consider aggressor status when deciding whom to prosecute because doing 
so accords with deeply held principles of individual morality. This Subsection 
suggests that, for that reason and others, weighing aggressor status in favor of 
prosecutions can also enhance international criminal law’s ability to advance the 
aims that it seeks to attain. To be sure, most of the literature surrounding the 
purposes of international criminal law centers on the way in which the sanctions 
imposed by criminal bodies advance various penological goals, such as retribution, 
deterrence, and incapacitation.237 However, more recently, scholars have recognized 
that case selection strategies can also promote or inhibit these ends.238 
That said, two caveats are immediately in order. First, there is no general 
agreement about which aims international criminal law should be pursuing,239 nor is 
there consensus that international criminal prosecutions are even capable of 
advancing any of the penological goals just mentioned.240 This Article cannot settle 
those debates, and thus it will assume that international criminal law, in general, and 
the tribunals’ case selection decisions, in particular, can advance various penological 
goals. Second, I must acknowledge that, although many scholars and practitioners 
make bold claims about the impact of this or that case selection method, most of 
these claims are supported by little or no empirical evidence. Human rights groups, 
for instance, have excoriated the ICTR for failing to prosecute members of the RFP, 
claiming that that failure has “taint[ed] perceptions of the Tribunal’s impartiality 
and undermine[d] its legitimacy for years to come.”241 Although that sentiment has 
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been oft repeated,242 it may be inaccurate, and it is certainly lacking in an empirical 
foundation, as William Schabas convincingly argued.243 Debates such as these 
highlight our inability to predict the precise impact of many case selection 
practices,244 and for that reason, I advance my arguments with due humility. 
I start with retribution, which is unquestionably a central aim of 
international criminal law.245 If prosecutors seek to advance retribution through their 
case selection decisions, then they must determine who is most deserving of 
punishment and allocate their prosecutions in accordance with that determination. 
Although that might sound straightforward, it is no small task to determine who is 
“most deserving” of punishment because there is no uncontested means of ranking 
desert in this context. Happily, for present purposes, we have no need to assess the 
relative heinousness of rape versus deportation, for instance, because it is sufficient 
to recognize that, all things being equal, a person who commits Crime A in an effort 
to win a war of aggression is more deserving of punishment than a person who 
commits the same Crime A in an effort to defend against a war of aggression. Thus, 
as between these two defendants, prosecutors seeking to enhance retribution would 
allocate more prosecutions to defendants fighting wars of aggression. To be sure, 
some such defendants mistakenly believe themselves to be fighting in self-defense, 
and that mistake may reduce their moral culpability.246 That fact, however, does not 
undercut the conclusion that weighing aggressor status in favor of prosecutions 
generally advances retributory goals because some unjust combatants will be aware 
that they are unjust combatants.247 For that reason, taken as a whole, unjust 
combatants who commit Crime A are more deserving of punishment than just 
combatants who commit Crime A. 
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The foregoing analysis gives rise to two observations. First, it should go 
without saying that any defendant who commits an international crime deserves 
punishment. Indeed, in defending the equal application doctrine, legal scholars 
frequently observe that civilians need protection against all jus in bello violators—
those acting on behalf of aggressor parties as well as those acting on behalf of 
defender parties.248 So, all perpetrators of Crime A should be prosecuted, and in an 
ideal world, all would be. But where enforcement scarcity precludes the prosecution 
of most violations, then prosecutors can advance retribution by allocating more 
enforcement against individuals who commit a particular crime in the service of an 
illegal or immoral goal—e.g., a war of aggression—than in the service of a laudable 
goal—e.g., self-defense. 
Second, I recognize that my example is somewhat contrived. Although it 
is incontrovertible that an individual who commits a particular crime as part of an 
aggressive war is more deserving of punishment than an individual who commits 
the same crime as part of a defensive war, rarely in the real world do two individuals 
commit the exact same international crime. Indeed, the crimes that are prosecuted 
by international tribunals are typically widespread and feature numerous criminal 
acts that span large geographical regions, occur over long time periods, and harm 
hundreds or thousands of victims. Thus, because no two international crimes are 
ever exactly the same, the aggressor status of the defendant will always comprise, 
at most, one factor to be considered when allocating prosecutions. 
In addition to advancing retribution, considering aggressor status in 
prosecutorial allocations has significant potential to enhance the legitimacy of 
international criminal tribunals with their core constituencies. Legitimacy has only 
recently come to the fore as a vital interest of the international criminal tribunals. In 
the early days of international criminal law, the most pressing challenges facing the 
nascent discipline were largely practical ones: conducting investigations in conflict 
zones, obtaining custody over suspects, protecting witnesses from retaliatory 
violence, and the like. Most of these practical challenges remain, and they impede 
international criminal tribunals’ efforts to conduct fair and efficient trials that reach 
accurate findings.249 But maintaining credibility and legitimacy among victims and 
other important constituencies has emerged as another core challenge. 
Indeed, a large body of scholarship now surrounds international criminal 
law’s perceived legitimacy crisis. International criminal tribunals are said to impair 
their legitimacy when they impose sentences that are too long or too short.250 
International criminal tribunals are said to undermine their legitimacy when they fail 
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to adequately involve local communities.251 And, as relevant here, international 
criminal tribunals are regularly said to undermine their legitimacy through their case 
selection practices.252 Writing of the ICC, for instance, Meg deGuzman has 
persuasively argued: 
[The Court’s] legitimacy depends to a significant degree on whether 
[relevant] audiences perceive the Court . . . as selecting appropriate 
crimes and defendants for prosecution. If important constituencies 
view the Court as making the wrong choices, they are likely to 
withdraw their support from the Court and possibly even seek its 
destruction.253  
“Wrong choices” come in many flavors, but the evidence marshaled in Section A 
compellingly suggests that one set of choices that are widely perceived to be wrong 
are those that allocate prosecutions while taking no account of the justness of the 
combatant’s cause. These allocations—as we saw in Sierra Leone—are apt to 
delegitimize the tribunal with local constituencies. 
John Darley and Paul Robinson have shown that domestic criminal justice 
systems lose moral credibility and relevance when their decisions diverge from 
community norms.254 We can expect international criminal tribunals to suffer the 
same fate when their decisions—including their case selection decisions—diverge 
from such norms. Indeed, any loss of moral credibility may be all the more 
concerning for international tribunals because they frequently command less respect 
and allegiance from local populations than do domestic criminal justice systems.255 
Moreover, international criminal tribunals were established to advance a whole host 
of goals—including ending the cycle of violence,256 preventing collective blame,257 
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and enhancing peace and reconciliation among formerly warring parties258—but 
each of these crucially depends on community buy-in.259 The SCSL’s experience 
indicates that that buy-in will not be forthcoming unless the tribunals’ case selection 
decisions take account of aggressor status. 
CONCLUSION 
The equal application doctrine is a fundamental tenet of IHL. It appears in 
treaties, case law, treatises, and lectures. Legal scholar after statesman, diplomat 
after military commander, has repeatedly declared it crucially important to preserve 
the equal application of jus in bello rules across all parties to the conflict. States at 
war do not always do so, and nonlegal scholars critique the doctrine on moral 
grounds, but the equal application doctrine unquestionably advances humanitarian 
aims, and for that reason, it should be retained. This Article advocates the unequal 
enforcement of jus in bello rules as a path between the moral reasoning that 
challenges the equal application doctrine and the practical necessities that sustain it. 
The foregoing Parts have shown that the equal enforcement of jus in bello rules is 
just as morally problematic as is their equal application, but that unequal 
enforcement will not lead to the humanitarian tragedies that we can expect following 
unequal application of jus in bello rules. Indeed, this Article goes on to contend that 
differentially enforcing jus in bello rules on the basis of aggressor status is apt to 
enhance the value that IHL enforcement provides to affected societies. 
This Article has centered on advancing and defending the following 
theoretical proposition: the IHL system, as well as the international criminal 
tribunals, would benefit from the unequal enforcement of jus in bello rules. If that 
theoretical proposition is to be implemented, however, then additional questions 
must be addressed. Part II highlighted the need to adopt standards for assessing 
aggressor status, and prosecutors would also need to determine how aggressor status 
should weigh up against other factors that also point in favor of prosecutions. 
Because the latter inquiry is intensely fact based, it is not clear that useful 
guidance—that spans different conflicts, locations, and political context—can be 
provided. But I will make my best efforts in subsequent work. 
For purposes of this Article, the central takeaway is that “who started it” 
matters. That proposition—so powerful on the elementary school playground—is 
likewise compelling on the battlefield . . . and in the courtroom. 
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